A meta-risk regulation approach to financial and corporate governance failure: lessons from Anglo Irish Bank’s Minsky moment

This thesis examines the roots of regulation in modern policymaking, with particular attention given to the evolution of financial regulation and corporate governance in Ireland. Through case study evidence of Anglo Irish Bank’s failure, it shows that when banks are systemic in nature, inadequate internal risk controls within a Minsky credit cycle can lead to destabilising macroeconomic conditions, which may prolong the effects of a credit-induced downturn. The thesis proposes the adoption of a supervisory approach based on meta-risk regulation (MRR), which is designed to strengthen the risk management practices of regulators and banks. It also shows that well governed firms operating in weak country-level governance structures receive an ‘investability’ premium. This may provide an incentive for firms in emerging markets, or ones operating in lax regulatory environments, to buffer their internal risk management practices in line with MRR.