The incompatibility of modern international relations realism with the principle of the equilibrium of power

This work aims to develop a particular criticism of the modern Realist doctrine of International Relations theory, primarily the structural variant as it has developed in the context of the post-Cold War era. It is argued that such types of Realism, which is in general a modern variant of the historically established tradition of Reason of State theorising, present an implicitly prescriptive model of amoral power-maximisation by the state. It is observed that this strong unilateralism is incompatible with the minimal level of international cooperation necessary to establish and maintain a system of power equilibrium.

The research draws upon two recent tendencies within International Relations theory, being the observations that theories are inherently normative in their nature and that both Classical and Structural Realism are types of a normative doctrine of a conflictual international system founded upon an empiricist and historicist methodology. From these positions, it is argued that the equilibrium of power provides a universally valid account of the international good for theory to promote and that Realism, with its historically-defended account of a ‘naturally’ conflictual states-system and/or a power-maximising human nature without rational restraint, can (despite the efforts of the Classical Realists) provide no coherent general theoretical justification for states to abide by the principle of equilibrium in practise.

The equilibrium of power must instead be supported with a theory of a minimal security cooperation between states. It is suggested that the older tradition of Natural Law theorising – with the concepts of the rational nature of man and of a natural sociability within the (international) State of Nature – can theoretically justify this minimal cooperation that is necessary for the preservation of equilibrium and the opposition to (potentially hegemonic) policies of power-maximisation. This philosophy, the work concludes, has the capability to provide a model for the reconciliation of the Reason of State with moral-political principles in a way that is in theory and in practise more in keeping with the rational self-interest of the state than is the amoral doctrine of modern Structural Realism.