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Large population evolutionary games played within a life history framework

Date
2009
Abstract
In many evolutionary games, such as parental care games, the length of time spent playing a realisation of the game is dependent on the strategy of an individual. Also, the payoff of a deserting male cannot be defined in isolation from the strategies used in the population as a whole. Such games should be defined as games against the field (large population games) rather than two-player games. Several examples are presented to illustrate the theory of such games against the field.
Supervisor
Description
peer-reviewed
Publisher
Politechnika Wroclawska, Oficyna Wydawnicza
Citation
Operations Research and Decisions;7(2), pp. 51-74
Collections
Mathematics & Statistics
BIO-SI - Bio-Statistics & Informatics Project
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Ramsey_2009.pdf
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Keywords
evolutionary game theory, game against the field, evolutionarily stable strategy, neighbourhood invasion strategy, polymorphism
ULRR Identifiers
https://hdl.handle.net/10344/3049
 https://doi.org/10.34961/4123
Funding code
Funding Information
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI)
Sustainable Development Goals
External Link
Type
Article
Rights
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/1.0/
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