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Legislative Decision-Making in the German Reichstag, 1867–1918: A New Dataset of Roll Call Votes

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Abstract This research note introduces a novel and comprehensive dataset of parliamentary membership spells and roll call votes taken in the German Reichstag between 1867 and 1918. After discussing the collection, cross-validation, and organisation of the data, it describes the development of various features of the Reichstag, its members, and their voting behaviour over time. Through its extensive temporal scope and broad diversity in the content of votes covered, the data offer new opportunities for studying the development of political parties and party competition, the adoption of major policy innovations and reforms, as well as decision-making in the constitutional assembly and subsequent democratization and de-democratization episodes. A scaling analysis of the number and nature of the Reichstag's political conflict dimensions illustrates its utility. The results indicate that the conflict space was two-dimensional throughout the Empire's existence, which might have contributed to stabilising the Kaiser's authoritarian rule.

Keywords Legislative politics · Party politics · Democratization · Political development · Historical political economy · Roll call votes · Political conflict dimensions

1 Legislative Voting in the German Reichstag

Political scientists increasingly turn to historical data to revisit classic questions in political and economic development or to examine novel ideas about historical persistence with modern methods of statistical and causal inference (Capoccia and

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Ziblatt 2010; Charnysh et al. 2023; Cirone and Pepinsky 2022; Cirone and Spirling 2021; Jenkins and Rubin 2024; Spirling 2014). Information about parliamentarians' vote choices is a particularly versatile source of data (Sieberer et al. 2020), enabling the measurement of various concepts of interest, in terms of both the causes and the consequences of legislative behaviour.

Indeed, in the German case, historical roll call vote data of the various legislative bodies have been used to study the number and content of political conflict dimensions (Häge 2019; Hansen and Debus 2012; Herrmann and Sieberer 2019; Mattheisen 1981; Smith and Turner 1981), the political orientation of individual deputies (Becker and Hornung 2020), the formation and cohesiveness of legislative parties (Schröder and Manow 2014; Sieberer and Herrmann 2019; Smith and Turner 1981), and the development of parliamentary government (Sieberer and Herrmann 2020). Specific roll call votes have been studied to examine factors affecting legislators' vote choices in the adoption of repressive legislation (Thomson 2015), protectionist trade policies (Schonhardt-Bailey 1998), and different types of electoral reforms (Ardanaz and Mares 2014; Kasara and Mares 2017; Leemann and Mares 2014; Mares 2015; Schröder and Manow 2020; Ziblatt 2008).

To further facilitate such research, I introduce a comprehensive dataset of roll call votes taken in the German Reichstag between 1867 and 1918. The data consist of more than 340,000 individual vote choices for the full universe of 901 roll call votes taken in the 15 legislative terms of the Reichstag of the North German Confederation (1867–1870) and the German Empire (1871–1918). The 'raw' information about legislators' vote choices is complemented by separately collected information about the identity and membership spells of legislators, their electoral and legislative party affiliation, their electoral district, and the date and type of their election, as well as meta information about the roll call votes themselves. These features greatly increase the utility of the data and ease and expedite analyses: The disambiguation of legislators' identities facilitates the study of temporal changes and long-term developments in legislative behaviour; the unique election identifier makes it easier to link Reichstag members to their district-level election results as well as to socio-economic conditions in their constituencies; and the meta information allows for quickly identifying individual roll call votes and controlling for or investigating effects of roll call-level characteristics.

Next to its value for studying questions about the historical political development of Germany, the dataset also constitutes a significant contribution towards enabling the comparative analysis of such processes, complementing similar data collection efforts that have so far focused on Anglo-Saxon countries (Eggers and Spirling 2014; Godbout and Høyland 2013; Godbout and Smaz 2016; Poole and Rosenthal 2007). From a comparative perspective, the German case is particularly interesting, as it provides a contrasting development path of partial democratisation in a separation-of-powers system in which universal and equal male suffrage was granted early, parliament had full legislative powers in domestic policymaking within the

constraints of a symmetric bicameral system, but government and executive power more generally remained firmly in the hands of the monarch.¹

In the following, I first describe the collection and organisation of the data. The subsequent section examines temporal changes in institutional rules, aggregate vote results, and the organisation of Reichstag proceedings over time. In methodological terms, this section highlights potential sources of heterogeneity in the data-generation process that analysts should be aware of. To illustrate the data's usefulness, I then discuss the results of a scaling analysis of the number and content of political conflict dimensions. Finally, the last section concludes with the discussion of further possible applications.

2 Data Collection and Organisation

The data are organised in the form of three datasets in tidy format (Wickham 2014), the observations of which can be linked and merged through identifier (ID) variables. This format allows for the easy aggregation and reshaping of the data to answer research questions at various levels of analysis (Sieberer et al. 2020).² Two of the datasets provide roll call vote information: One includes the vote choices of individual legislators, and the other includes meta information about the roll call votes. The third dataset provides information about Reichstag membership spells and other individual-level characteristics of legislators. Figure 1 provides an overview of the data organisation, structure, and content. Most information in these datasets was derived from the official Reichstag session reports and handbooks, which have been digitised by the Bavarian State Library.³ Overall, the collection resulted in a dataset of more than 343,000 vote choice records (including various forms of absences) related to 901 roll call votes and 2703 individual legislators in 6357 membership spells. In the following, I provide further detail about the data collection and its validation for each table.

2.1 Membership Spell Data

As in modern-day parliaments (Turner-Zwinkels et al. 2022), membership in the Reichstag saw considerable turnover during a legislative term. Deputies exited the Reichstag prematurely for various reasons (Anderson 2000, p. 291): Some died,

¹ The online appendix provides a more detailed description of the political system of Imperial Germany and the role of the Reichstag in it.

² For example, if the election through which a deputy was elected to the Reichstag is irrelevant for the analysis, collapsing multiple membership spells within a legislative term can be done effortlessly in tidy format: They are recorded as *observations* and directly linkable to higher-level deputy or party information recorded in other variables. This information can then be used to merge or aggregate membership spell values by. In contrast, in a traditional roll call vote matrix format, several membership spells of the same deputy would need to be recorded as separate *columns*. This format does not provide a way to record and directly link information about higher-level variables to each column, which makes collapsing or aggregating columns by values of those higher-level variables difficult, if not impossible.

³ Available at <https://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/index.html> (accessed 12 January 2026).




Fig. 1 Data organisation and content. *ID* identifier, *CAP* Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al. 2019).

some lost their mandate because of election irregularities, and some stepped down for health or other personal reasons. Possibly a particular feature of the German case is that deputies lost their mandate if they got appointed to or were promoted in public office. Many of the resulting vacancies were re-filled during the term through by-elections (Häge 2026). In the cases of mandates lost as a result of election irregularities or promotions in public office, the same deputies were often re-elected and returned to the Reichstag for another membership spell.

Unfortunately, the entries and exits of deputies were not comprehensively or consistently recorded in Reichstag session reports. To first arrive at a comprehensive and authoritative list of Reichstag members, I matched and cross-validated records from Wikipedia lists of Reichstag members, the database of Reichstag deputies created from legislators' biographical entries in the Reichstag handbooks by the Bavarian State Library, and district-level election data (Häge 2026).⁴ Cross-validation with the election data proved crucial, given the uncertainty about the reliability of Wikipedia

⁴ The links to the Wikipedia pages for Reichstag membership lists of various legislative terms are available at https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_Reichstagsabgeordneten_des_Deutschen_Kaiserreichs (ac-

information and the omission from the Reichstag handbooks of members who were elected through by-elections during the term.

The precise start and end dates of legislators' membership spells were hard to discern. The date of actual entry of newly elected members into the Reichstag varied considerably, and before 1888, it was not systematically recorded in the registers of Reichstag session reports. Thus, I used the election date as the start date of a membership spell. In contrast, exit dates were recorded in the registers throughout the period. In general, the exit date records the day on which the exit of a member was announced in plenary, rather than the actual exit date. The partial exceptions are deaths of deputies. As of 1898, the actual day the member died was recorded. Especially for the pre-1895 period, a large number of exit dates were missing and had to be manually added based on information in session reports, historical newspaper reports, and election compendia (Phillips 1883; Reibel 2007; Specht and Schwabe 1904).

Individual membership spells form the rows in the resulting dataset. Besides the start and end dates of the spell, the type of entrance (regular or by-election) and exit (regular, election invalid, resignation, mandate lapsed, or death), and the name of the deputy, the variables record the election district, the party under whose label the deputy was elected (i.e. electoral party), and the parliamentary group he joined in the Reichstag (i.e. legislative party) at the beginning of the membership spell. With respect to party group membership, the data also record whether a deputy was a full member or a guest (i.e., a so-called *Hospitant*). The party variables also result from cross-validating and reconciling information from the Wikipedia lists, the Reichstag handbooks, and the election data. Finally, the membership data include a unique district-level election identifier that can be used to merge the membership spell with election results (Häge 2026) and socio-economic constituency characteristics.

2.2 Metadata

The meta information for roll call votes was collected from various types of session report documents. First, I extracted most of the meta information about roll call votes up to mid-1895 from the list of roll call votes published in the appendix of the General Register (Deutscher Reichstag 1896). For the period afterwards, this type of information is contained in the periodically published registers of the session reports. To enable searches in the registers, the Bavarian State Library has fully digitised them.⁵ I scraped the relevant register texts from its webpages. Based on the description of individual roll call votes in the register, I created a number of variables about the stage of the legislative procedure, the type of decision, and the aggregate vote outcome, as well as the title of the proposal and the particular issue within the proposal that was voted on. Where some of this information was missing, I collected it manually from other parts of the session reports, in particular the debate protocols

cessed 12 January 2026), the database of Reichstag deputies is available at <https://www.reichstag-abgeordnetendatenbank.de> (accessed 12 January 2026), and the original Reichstag handbooks are available at <https://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/rtbhauf.html> (accessed 12 January 2026).

⁵ Available at <https://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/suche.html> (accessed 12 January 2026).

and parliamentary documents. Finally, I manually coded the content of the vote by classifying the proposal titles into policy topics according to the coding scheme of the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al. 2019).⁶

2.3 Vote Data

The data about individual vote choices was collected from the Reichstag debate protocols and the roll call vote appendix of the 1896 general register. Using optical character recognition software, I extracted the vote information from the relevant PDF documents. Unfortunately, the format of the reporting of roll call votes varied over time. For the period up to mid-1895, the appendix to the General Register (*Deutscher Reichstag 1896*) includes an overview of all decisions of deputies on all roll call votes taken up to that point in time. However, different forms of absences were not recorded in the appendix. I added these types of vote records from the original debate protocols. For the period after mid-1895, I collected all vote information directly from the debate protocols. Given the technical difficulties in recognising Fraktur font in complex page layouts, all extracted voting records required extensive manual review and corrections.

The vote records were then matched by roll call vote ID with the metadata and by name and date with the membership spell ID in the membership data. In a last set of consistency checks, I first checked that the aggregate vote results, originally recorded in the session report registers, and included in the metadata, conformed with the aggregate vote results calculated from individual voting decisions in the vote data. In the case of inconsistencies, both the original vote and register records were reviewed and errors in the respective dataset corrected. To check the consistency of individual vote records and the membership data, I confirmed that deputies voted only during their membership spells and that any missing vote information between the first and last recorded vote during a member's membership spell was not due to an extraction or data coding error but due to missing information in the original source.

3 Reichstag Membership and Roll Call Votes Over Time

To provide a bird's-eye view of the data, Fig. 2 plots the temporal development of various features of the Reichstag, its members, and their voting behaviour. It does so by combining the roll call and membership data with contextual information about the length of legislative terms, sessions, and meeting times. The horizontal axis represents time. The width of the rectangular boxes indicates the start and end dates of the 15 legislative terms of the Reichstag—the first two of the North German Confederation and the 13 remaining of the German Empire. The height of the boxes shows the total number of members during a legislative term. Initially, the Reichstag of the North German Confederation consisted of 297 members. This

⁶ The Comparative Agendas Project codebook is available at <https://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/master-codebook> (accessed 12 January 2026).




Fig. 2 Reichstag meetings, membership, and roll call votes over time. Shaded areas indicate meeting times; points indicate the time of a roll call vote and the total number of members voting. See Table A1 in the online appendix for a correspondence table of the aggregation of Comparative Policy Agendas major topics into policy types.

number increased to 382 members after accession of the South German states and the formation of the German Empire in 1871. Finally, the last increase to 397 members occurred in 1874, following the entry of deputies from annexed Alsace-Lorraine. Correspondingly, the quorum of 50% of members, indicated by the dashed horizontal line, increased from 149 to 192 and then to 199 members. Although the effective threshold for requesting a roll call vote was always 50 members throughout the period, the effective threshold decreased because of the growing membership, from an initial 16.8% of members in 1867 to 13.1% in 1871 and then to 12.6% in 1874.⁷

The shaded areas within the boxes indicate actual meeting periods within a term. At first, meeting periods corresponded to formal sessions of the Reichstag, indicated in black at the bottom of the figure. However, the close of a session also meant the expiry of all bills. Thus, from 1890 onwards, the work of the Reichstag was divided into fewer sessions. Instead, meetings were increasingly ‘adjourned’ for prolonged periods of time. The grey and black step lines indicate the total number of current members and the total number of initial members remaining at that point in time during the legislative term, respectively. Finally, the points represent the dates and the total number of members voting in the roll call votes. The colour of the points distinguishes votes on social and economic issues versus votes on regime matters.

The figure demonstrates several interesting developments. First, meeting density increased considerably in the first few Reichstag terms, from about 30% of days of the total duration of the term in the first ordinary Reichstag of the North German Confederation (1867–1870) to more than 55% in the sixth Reichstag term of the Empire (1884–1887). In the remainder of the period, meeting days as a share of the overall duration of the term varied between 40% and 60%. The relative number of meeting days dropped dramatically in the 13th Reichstag, mainly caused by long adjournments of meetings after the start of World War I in 1914. The roll call vote density was comparatively high in the constituting and first ordinary Reichstag of the North German Confederation, as well as the first Reichstag of the German Empire. During those terms, the Reichstag held 32, 22, and 15 roll call votes per 100 meeting days, respectively. In the remainder of the period, the number of roll call votes per 100 meeting days varied between 5 and 12. Exceptionally higher numbers of 19 and 16 roll call votes per 100 meeting days were recorded in the 10th and 12th Reichstag, respectively.

The larger number of roll call votes in the early period might be partly due to the fact that all votes that were too close to call would automatically trigger a roll call vote before the *Hammelsprung* (i.e. vote by division) was introduced in 1874 (Hatschek 1915, p. 71). However, in 1870 during the first ordinary term of the North German Confederation, the Reichstag also adopted a new federal criminal code, which involved 23 roll call votes by itself. The unusually large number of roll call votes in the 10th Reichstag was the result of minority party groups using roll call votes to obstruct parliamentary proceedings (Koß 2018, pp. 137–138). In 1900, the left-liberals and the social democrats obstructed the adoption of an amendment to

⁷ The online appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the formal rules and procedures and the informal practices governing Reichstag proceedings.

the criminal code to restrict artistic freedoms (the so-called Lex Heinze), and in 1902, they obstructed the adoption of the new tariff law. Out of a total of 191 roll call votes during that term, 26 related to the Lex Heinze and 121 to the tariff law. In the 12th Reichstag, the new federal law of associations in 1908, the finance reform in 1909, and the federal insurance code in 1911 attracted a larger number of votes (16, 14, and 26, respectively, out of a total of 146 roll call votes).

In Fig. 2, these types of dependencies across roll call votes related to the same bill are visible in the form of temporally concentrated, vertically ‘stacked’ sets of points. The metadata include a variable indicating the ‘topic’ of the vote. In most instances, the topic refers to a bill the roll call vote relates to. The topic variable makes it possible to identify and, if deemed necessary, adjust or account for dependencies within these types of roll call vote clusters. However, all of these bills were substantially important and controversial. Thus, although their cumulation in a single legislative term might have been unusual, the larger number of roll call votes related to each of them individually was not. In some respects, the number of votes on a bill constitutes a natural weight of its importance. Only the disproportionately large number of votes on the tariff bill in 1902, caused by the obstruction of especially the social democrats, clearly stands out for its potential to distort analyses and should probably be adjusted for in most analyses based on the data. As an example of such an adjustment, the scaling analysis reported below is based on a random sample of 25 instead of the full set of 121 roll call votes relating to this bill.

The majority sizes and the type of content of the roll call votes show two additional development patterns. First, while votes on regime issues (blue points) clearly dominated the early period of state building in the 1860s and 1870s, votes on social and economic issues (red points) were considerably more prevalent from the eighth Reichstag (1881–1884) onwards. The only later term in which regime votes were slightly more common than social and economic votes was the 11th term (1903–1907). The number of votes cast also indicates a recurrent problem throughout the period until allowances for deputies were introduced in 1906 (Butzer 1999, p. 312): The Reichstag was often marred by low attendance, which regularly resulted in the required 50% quorum for reaching valid decisions not being met. As data points below the dashed line indicate, in a number of instances, the lack of a quorum was formally determined by the result of a roll call vote. After a high of 74% in the first Reichstag term of the German Empire, the average number of members taking part in a roll call vote actually decreased to a low of 60% in the 11th term, with a distinctive drop visible in the early 1890s. Again, starting in the early 1890s, the number of roll call votes that did not meet the quorum increased rapidly from at most one before the start of the eighth term (1890–1893) up to 12 in the 11th term (1903–1907). After allowances were introduced in 1906, the rate of attendance increased to about 82%, and the number of missed quorums dropped to zero.

The final point to note in Fig. 2 is the considerable turnover of members within a legislative term. The grey stepped line indicates the total number of members at a particular point in time, and the black line indicates the remaining number of initial members who had joined at the beginning of the legislative term. The steepness of the slope of the black line is an indication of the speed of turnover in the

membership. In general, between 5% and 20% of legislators' memberships did not continue throughout the duration of the term. Standardised by the length of the term, a decreasing trend over time is visible, from about 14–20 legislators per year at the beginning to about 10 legislators per year at the end of the sample period. A legislative term with an unusually large turnover for its time by both measures (20% of the membership and 15 legislators per year) is the fourth legislative term (1878–1881). During that term, a disproportionately large number of National Liberals resigned, and a disproportionately large number of Free Conservatives lost their mandate, many because they were promoted in public office. Thus, the large turnover in the Reichstag coincides with the end of the liberal era and Bismarck's reorientation away from the National Liberals towards stronger reliance on conservatives and Catholics to support his government policies.

To summarise, the number of Reichstag members increased over time due to territorial expansion, which had implications for the quorum and reduced the effective member threshold for requesting a roll call vote; the introduction of votes by division in 1874 removed the automatic triggering of a roll call when a vote was too close to call; attendance and turnout increased substantively after allowances were granted to Reichstag members in 1906; the content of votes changed from a larger number of votes on regime issues towards more social and economic issues over time; and requests for roll call votes were used by opposition parties as a means of obstructing the adoption of a couple of laws in the 10th legislative term (1898–1903). Researchers using the data should consider whether any of these data features pose threats to the inferences to be drawn from their analyses.

4 Political Conflict Dimensions in the German Empire

To illustrate the utility of the dataset, this section presents the results of an optimal classification analysis (Armstrong II et al. 2014; Poole 2005) of the number and nature of political conflict dimensions underlying Reichstag decision-making. The analysis reproduces and extends Häge's (2019) analysis of the Bismarck era to include roll call votes both in the constituting Reichstag of 1867 and in the six legislative terms of the post-1890 Wilhelmine era. For the Bismarck era, Häge (2019) found that political conflict was mainly structured along two dimensions: one relating to socio-economic issues and one relating to regime matters. The socio-economic dimension pitted left- and right-wing liberals as well as social democrats, who favoured free trade, deregulated labour markets, the abolition of feudal and church prerogatives, and a strong centralised nation state, against conservative, Catholic, and various regional and ethnic minority groups, who advocated for protectionist economic policies, the maintenance of existing social hierarchies, and the continued autonomy of the Reich's federal states. The regime dimension divided social democrats, left-liberals, the Catholic Centre Party, and various minority groups from the conservative party groups and the right-wing-liberal National Liberals. The former camp championed civil rights and liberties as well as stronger parliamentary powers, whereas the latter defended the current constitutional structure and regime.




Fig. 3 Legislators' ideal points and their partisan orientation by legislative term. Legislator ideal points based on two-dimensional optimal classification models; ideal points rotated to ensure that centroid of German Conservatives lies on diagonal in upper right quadrant. Some 'party orientations' aggregate separate parliamentary groups within and across legislative terms that share a similar type of political outlook (see Table A2 in the online appendix for a correspondence table between party groups and party orientation). No scaling solution could be produced for RT03 1877/1878, as only nine roll call votes were held during this very short legislative term. *NG00/NG01* = constituting/first ordinary legislative term of the Reichstag of the North German Confederation, *RT01–RT13* = legislative terms of the Reichstag of the German Empire

The analysis reproduces Häge's (2019) findings and shows that they extend into the Wilhelmine period.⁸ Initially, the Reichstag's political conflict space was one-dimensional, with both socio-economic and regime views mapping on a general left–right ideology distinguishing liberals and conservatives in the case of the two Reichstag terms of the North German Confederation. After the strong electoral entry of the catholic Centre Party in 1871, however, the conflict space became more complex, as the Centre Party held conservative views on socio-economic questions but liberal views on regime topics. Furthermore, significant parts of the National Liberals started to side with conservatives on regime issues while retaining more liberal views on socio-economic matters. Thus, the transition from a one- to a two-dimensional space is primarily a result of the emergence of new and changing views of existing legislative actors. Remarkably, even if it did not consistently manifest itself in the legislative agenda and thus in the roll call vote record in every legislative term, this two-dimensional conflict space structured party–political competition in the German Empire until the collapse of the regime in 1918.⁹

Figure 3 plots the legislator ideal points of the optimal classification solution. For comparative purposes, the two-dimensional solution is plotted for all legislative terms, even where the second dimension adds little to the classification accuracy. For each legislative term, the constellation of ideal points is rotated such that the centroid of the German Conservatives, which held positions at one of the polar ends of both the regime and socio-economic dimensions, lies on the diagonal line in the upper right quadrant of the coordinate system. The diagonal, indicated as a dashed line in the panels, can be thought of as a general left–right dimension, which separated left-wing liberals, and later social democrats, at one extreme, from German Conservative at the other. It is also the more appropriate dimension to interpret in cases where the model fit statistics indicate the appropriateness of a one-dimensional solution (i.e., for NG00, NG01, RT02, and RT 10).

Regarding the practical implications of these findings, the two-dimensional nature of the political conflict space enabled the government to rule with varying majorities and weakened the relatively splintered opposition. The existence of a strong one-dimensional divide between opposition parties on the one side and regime-supporting parties on the other would have provided the former with more leverage to extract concessions from the government in terms of policy or institutional reforms. The lack of a coherent opposition camp meant that the Imperial government, as the main

⁸ The complete analysis, including model fit statistics for the determination of the dimensionality of the space, is reported in the online appendix.

⁹ See the online appendix for a discussion of the exceptions.

legislative agenda-setter, was often able to avoid gridlock and construct majorities that suited its interests. As such, the two-dimensional nature of the political conflict space might have contributed to the long-term stability of the Kaiser's authoritarian regime.

5 Conclusion

The dataset introduced in this research note creates opportunities to investigate a myriad of questions about the political development of Germany and should be of interest to researchers in the areas of legislative and party politics, public policy and political economy, and authoritarian politics and democratisation studies. With respect to legislative and party politics, the dataset facilitates the study of questions related to the development of parties, party competition, and executive–legislative relations. For example, the temporal extension of Häge's (2019) scaling analysis of political conflict dimensions during the Bismarck era reported above shows that the original finding of a two-dimensional conflict space also extends to the post-1890 Wilhelmine period, which has important implications for our assessment of the Empire's governing capacity and its possible consequences for the stability of the regime.

With respect to policy developments, the data allow study of the political and economic determinants of the adoption of various policy innovations and reforms that laid the legal and regulatory foundations of the modern German state (e.g. social insurance and consumer rights legislation, civil and criminal law code, various types of novel taxes). In terms of institutional developments, the data enable investigation of the original constitutional bargain in the constituting Reichstag of the North German Confederation and the determinants of subsequent constitutional and lower-level rule changes with implications for regime characteristics (e.g. legislation regarding press freedom and freedom of association, parliamentary oversight of the executive, or the repression of political opposition).

While the data alone open up new avenues for research, they also complement similar data collection efforts of historical roll call votes in parliaments for other, primarily Anglo-Saxon, countries (Eggers and Spirling 2014; Godbout 2020; Godbout and Smaz 2016; Poole and Rosenthal 2007), and following Sieberer and colleagues' (2020) publication of roll call vote data for the Bundestag from 1949 to 2013, the data constitute another significant step towards developing a long-term longitudinal dataset of parliamentary roll call votes in Germany. Eventually, the cumulation of these efforts will enable rigorous comparative research both across countries and within Germany over time.

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Data Availability The roll call vote and membership datasets as well as the replication files to reproduce the descriptive and exploratory analyses in this research note are available from the authors' Dataverse (Roll call vote data: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QD7WSG>; Membership data: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/SMVE01>; Replication files: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/W12AHJ>)

Conflict of interests F. M. Häge declares that he has no competing interests.

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