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Article

Combining Supervised and Reinforcement Learning to Build a Generic Defensive Cyber Agent

Muhammad Omer Farooq¹ and Thomas Kunz^{2,*}

¹ Department of Electronics and Computer Engineering, University of Limerick, V94 T9PX Limerick, Ireland; omer.farooq@ymail.com

² Department of Systems and Computer Engineering, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada

* Correspondence: tkunz@sce.carleton.ca

Abstract: Sophisticated mechanisms for attacking computer networks are emerging, making it crucial to have equally advanced mechanisms in place to defend against these malicious attacks. Autonomous cyber operations (ACOs) are considered a potential solution to provide timely defense. In ACOs, an agent that attacks the network is called a red agent, while an agent that defends against the red agent is called a blue agent. In real-world scenarios, different types of red agents can attack a network, requiring blue agents to defend against a variety of red agents, each with unique attack strategies and goals. This requires the training of blue agents capable of responding effectively, regardless of the specific strategy employed RED. Additionally, a generic blue agent must also be adaptable to different network topologies. This paper presents a framework for the training of a generic blue agent capable of defending against various red agents. The framework combines reinforcement learning (RL) and supervised learning. RL is used to train a blue agent against a specific red agent in a specific networking environment, resulting in multiple RL-trained blue agents—one for each red agent. Supervised learning is then used to train a generic blue agent using these RL-trained blue agents. Our results demonstrate that the proposed framework successfully trains a generic blue agent that can defend against different types of red agents across various network topologies. The framework demonstrates consistently improved performance over a range of existing methods, as validated through extensive empirical evaluation. Detailed comparisons highlight its robustness and generalization capabilities. Additionally, to enable generalization across different adversarial strategies, the framework employs a variational autoencoder (VAE) that learns compact latent representations of observations, allowing the blue agent to focus on high-level behavioral features rather than raw inputs. Our results demonstrate that incorporating a VAE into the proposed framework further improves its overall performance.



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Keywords: autonomous cyber operations (ACOs); cyber security; blue agent; red agent; generic blue agent; machine learning

1. Introduction

The present era is unprecedented in many ways, with the rapid increase in digital connectivity transforming our society in numerous areas. For instance, technology and digital connectivity have made remote working feasible, simplified information dissemination, enabled synchronous remote learning, and given rise to metaverse environments and online businesses. More intriguingly, the scope of digital connectivity has expanded to include connectivity among things, commonly known as the Internet of Things (IoT) [1].

IoT is becoming increasingly prevalent, playing a central role in changing how we interact with our environment. For example, autonomous and safe driving experiences are now possible because different sensors can autonomously connect to other sensor devices for information sharing and processing [2].

While our society is increasingly digitally connected, disruptions in connectivity can have significant impacts on daily life, especially in regions where digital infrastructure is widespread. At the core of this digital connectivity is a network of interconnected computer systems. These systems not only provide connectivity but also store valuable information and grant access to it. Consider a large organization with sites in different geographical regions. Personnel interact with colleagues across multiple sites using a computer network, and the resources they need to perform their jobs may be spread across these sites, necessitating reliance on the computer network to access these resources. It is crucial that interactions occur only among intended personnel and that resources be accessible only to authorized individuals. Any malicious activity in such a system can lead to undesirable outcomes, including information leaks, network downtime, and damage to digital resources. These scenarios can result in reputation damage, financial losses, and compromised operations, among other issues. While this example focuses on one organization, the same principles apply to any organization that relies on connected computer systems.

The above discussion highlights the importance of digital connectivity in our daily lives and underscores the necessity of securing connected computer systems to ensure continuous, effective, and efficient connectivity. Computer network security has been an active area of research for a long time, but its significance has only increased over time. This is primarily due to the emergence of new connectivity use cases [3]. Additionally, hackers are continually developing new methods to breach network security, leveraging their ability to understand the internal workings of security tools and the availability of automated scripting tools and enhanced computational power [4,5].

Recently, attackers have started using machine learning as a tool to target networked systems [6]. This presents a significant challenge to system security, as a human-based response alone may not be sufficient due to the potentially long time required to detect such attacks. Therefore, there is a need to develop automated intelligent methods that can detect and respond to attacks in a timely manner. Autonomous Cyber Operations (ACOs) aim to enhance the security of computer systems through machine-based decision making. ACOs offer several benefits, including timely attack detection, protection of isolated systems, and safeguarding of systems where trained human resources are lacking. In ACOs, two types of agents are considered: blue and red. A blue agent is responsible for defending against malicious attacks, while a red agent attempts to carry out malicious activities on the system. ACOs can potentially offer solutions for the complex landscape of digital threats and security challenges. By harnessing the power of artificial intelligence and machine learning, ACOs enable organizations to detect, analyze, and respond to cyber threats with unmatched speed and efficiency. As cyber attacks grow in sophistication and frequency, organizations need agile defenses that can quickly adapt to new threats and vulnerabilities. Autonomous systems can analyze and learn from each encounter, continuously refining their algorithms and strategies to stay ahead of emerging threats.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has been explored in various areas of computer network security, including penetration testing [7,8], malware detection [9,10], and anti-jamming communication systems [11,12]. Existing research demonstrates that RL can play a crucial role in networked systems' security, making it a promising machine learning paradigm for enhancing ACOs. In RL for ACOs, a computer network environment is modeled as a game involving blue and red agents with defined actions, network states, and rewards. This abstracted environment allows the agents to learn effective decision-making processes.

However, computer networks often consist of numerous and varied entities and are dynamic, resulting in a large state space. Additionally, agents have access to a wide range of possible actions, further enlarging the state space. This makes training effective agents for ACOs a challenging task. Moreover, optimizing hyper-parameters (HPs) is essential to enhance the performance of RL algorithms. Large action and state spaces make HP optimization more challenging and time-consuming, requiring numerous training runs to identify the optimal HPs.

The contribution of this paper are as listed as follows:

- A framework for generic blue agent training capable of dealing with various types of red agents;
- An enhanced version of the framework that incorporates a custom feed-forward neural network based on the principles of a variational autoencoder (VAE) into the original generic blue agent training framework;
- An examination of the limitations of retraining blue agents against different types of red agents in an attempt to develop a generalized blue agent;
- Experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the background and related work. Section 3 details the framework for generic blue agent training. Section 4 provides the performance evaluation results. Finally, Section 5 offers the conclusions.

2. Background and Related Work

The general categorization of machine learning methods is illustrated in Figure 1. This paper focuses on supervised learning and RL, so we provide a discussion of these two methods.




Figure 1. Categorization of machine learning techniques.

2.1. Supervised Learning

In supervised learning, a machine learning model is trained using an existing dataset with labels. Hence, before training an effective machine learning model using supervised learning, the data need to be gathered and processed. Data must be gathered in a systematic manner, as they directly affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the trained model. Data are not only required for model training, but they are also required for the testing of the model. Therefore, data collection serves two purposes: model training and model testing.

There are many supervised machine learning methods; however, the following are most commonly used: linear regression [13], logistic regression [14], support vector machines [15], decision trees, random forest [16], and neural networks [17].

2.2. Reinforcement Learning

RL is a machine learning paradigm [18] in which an agent/machine trains itself by interacting with an environment, as shown in Figure 2. The RL setup comprises the following: the environment, agent, state, action, and reward. In RL, an agent observes the environment at time t , capturing a state (S_t). It then chooses one of the available actions (A_t), which is applied to the environment. This leads to a change in the environment, resulting in a new state (S_{t+1}). At the same time, the environment provides an evaluation of the goodness of the action in the form of a reward (R_t). Actions that help an agent to progress towards a specific goal are rewarded positively; otherwise, the reward can be zero or negative. RL does not require an existing dataset to train a model, but it requires a training environment that is consistent with the target domain. For example, in order to use RL for ACOs, an agent needs an environment that mimics a network of computer systems, which the agent uses to train by performing actions and observing corresponding rewards (i.e., a sequence of rewards (R_t, R_{t+1})). Defining RL states and actions requires domain knowledge, and the level of accuracy in defining states and actions impacts the quality of the trained agent. RL seems to be a promising choice for ACOs, as no prior dataset is required; hence, red or blue agents can learn an optimal sequence of actions by interacting with the training environment. Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) represents an advancement over simple RL by incorporating neural networks into the RL framework. DRL offers several advantages over traditional RL methods [19]:

- DRL can effectively manage high-dimensional input spaces due to its capacity to acquire hierarchical data representations using deep neural networks.
- DRL models, when trained on extensive datasets, can exhibit strong abilities to generalize to novel environments or tasks, potentially minimizing the necessity for retraining on similar tasks.
- DRL has the capacity to acquire valuable representations of states and actions, facilitating more efficient learning and decision-making processes.




Figure 2. Reinforcement learning process.

Proximal Policy Optimization

The work presented here utilizes the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) RL method. Therefore, here, we briefly outline the details of the algorithm. In order to train a network, the algorithm considers small policy updates so that an agent reaches the optimal state. To control the step size during policy updates, the algorithm uses a clip function. To initiate the PPO training process, like any other RL training algorithm, the agent is placed in

an environment where it performs actions based on the input. In the early phase of training, the agent is allowed to freely explore solutions and record the outcomes. Later, after accumulating a sufficient amount of data and undergoing policy updates, the agent selects actions by randomly sampling from the probability distribution ($P(A|S)$) generated by the policy network. The actions most likely to be beneficial have the highest probability of being selected from the random sample. After the agent transitions to a different scenario, known as a state, by taking an action, it receives either a positive or negative reward. The agent's objective is to maximize its total rewards over an episode.

2.3. Reinforcement Learning Environments for Autonomous Cyber Operations

There are several RL training environments available for the training of agents in ACOs, such as those described in [20–23]. However, this work utilizes CybORG [24], which was released as part of CAGE Challenge 2. The remainder of this section focuses on CybORG.

CybORG: An Autonomous Cyber Operations Research Gym

Inspired by OpenAI Gym [25], CybORG [24] provides tools that facilitate the application of machine learning in ACOs. More specifically, it provides appropriate tools and environments to train decision-making models using RL in adversarial scenarios such as ACOs. A typical learning environment in CybORG consists of a computer network that is further partitioned into different subnets. A computer network in the learning environment contains the following: different types of hosts and servers, routers, switches, and firewalls. One such scenario in CybORG is shown in Figure 3. Apart from the listed networking entities, CybORG also provides the following teams: attackers and defenders. The attacker team tries to attack a network and disrupt its operation, whereas the defender team tries to defend the network against the attacker team. The attacker and defender teams are also called red and blue teams respectively. CybORG also provides different types of agents for the red team. Furthermore, it also comes with a green agent, whose task is to generate a network's users normal traffic.




Figure 3. A networking scenario in CybORG [24].

CybORG comes with two distinct red agents implemented: (i) *red_meander* and (ii) *b_line*. *b_line* is also called a baseline agent. Here, functionalities of red and blue agents are explained with reference to Figure 3. As shown in the figure, the network consists of a user subnet, an enterprise subnet, and an operational subnet. The operational subnet stores information about logistic servers and key manufacturing. Typically, a blue agent is activated by a monitoring system, and it executes a service on each host to detect any malicious software. If malicious software is detected, the agent removes it or, if an attacker has well-established itself, the blue agent restores the system to a clean state using a backup

mechanism. The red agents start the attack by accessing user hosts which are part of subnet 1. Exploitation and privilege escalation mechanisms are used by an attacker agent to access user hosts. Afterwards, servers in the enterprise subnet are exploited by the red agents. Once a server in the enterprise network is exploited, red agents obtain the IP address of the operational server to disrupt its services. The difference between the two red agents is their attack strategy. The *red_meander* agent explores the network on a subnet-by-subnet basis. In each subnet, it tries to compromise each host, finally reaching the operational server. On the other hand, the *b_line* agent, using prior knowledge of the network topology, tries to directly reach the operational server. The same method is used by both agents to decide on the exploitation mechanism to use on different hosts/servers. Primarily, as shown in Figure 2, RL uses the state/observation, action, and reward concept to train an agent. Hence, CyBORG comes with action spaces, observations, and rewards for red and blue agents. Tables 1 and 2 list some of the actions that red and blue agents can perform, respectively.

Table 1. Some actions of red agents.

Action	Description
Sleep	Does nothing, and there is no associated parameter.
DiscoverRemoteSystems	Performs a ping sweep, requiring subnet as a parameter. It returns active IP addresses on the subnet.
DiscoverNetworkServices	It is a port-scan action. It requires IP address as a parameter. It returns all the open ports and their respective services.
ExploitRemoteService	It is used for a service exploit to obtain a reverse shell on a host. IP address is required as an input parameter.
EternalBlue	Used to obtain SYSTEM access to a Windows-based machine.
PrivilegeEscalate	It is used to establish a privileged shell with root (Linux) or SYSTEM (Windows) privileges. For this action to succeed, a user shell is required on the target host.
FTPDiretoryTraversal	Used to traverse directories that a user is not supposed to access.
SQLInjection	Action that inserts malicious database code to execute.
Impact	Represents degradation of service. It requires host name as a parameter.

Table 2. Some actions of blue agents.

Action	Description
Sleep	Does nothing, and there is no associated parameter.
Analyse	Detects malware files on a host. Needs host name as a parameter.
Remove	Removes a red agent's user-level shell.
Restore	Restores a system state to a known safe state (results in network service disruption; hence, a large negative penalty is associated with this action).
Misinform	A decoy service action.
Monitor	Used to monitor host's state.

A blue agent is able to maintain information about all hosts and servers in a network as part of its observation space. The blue agent's observations about each host consist of the following: (i) interface, (ii) processes, (iii) sessions, (iv) system information, and (v) user information. Interface maintains information about the IP address, subnet, and interface

name. The processes part of the observation space maintains information about processes' IDs and their users. Session maintains information about the session owner, session ID, executing processes' IDs, and type of session. System information maintains information about a system's processor architecture, the operation system and its version, and the host name. Finally, user information maintains information about user groups, usernames, and passwords. Initially, the red agents' observation space only consists of the above-mentioned entities for User 0 in subnet 1. As part of an attack, red agents explore more about a network; hence, their observation expands. Through wrappers, CybORG provides the ability to model observation and action spaces in a format that allows us to apply RL algorithms from existing RL libraries, such as stablebaselines and RLLIB.

In CybORG, the action space is a combination of actions and parameters. The reason is that actions are cyber tools, and they typically require parameters to execute. CybORG defines separate actions for red and blue agents. Assigning appropriate rewards to different actions in an RL environment is an important task, and it needs to be done carefully, as it can have a huge impact on the RL process. For example, in the ACO scenario that is considered here, if a blue agent is not appropriately penalized for an action that cannot stop a red agent from disrupting network services, the resulting trained blue agent may not give due importance to the fact that the agent needs to stop the red agent from disrupting the network operation. Tables 3 and 4 show the rewards given to a blue agent in the case of successful admin access and a successful red action by a red host, respectively.

Table 3. Per-turn blue reward for red admin access.

Subnet	Hosts	Blue Reward for Red Access
Subnet 1	User Hosts	−0.1
Subnet 2	Enterprise Servers	−1
Subnet 3	Operational Server	−1
Subnet 3	Operational Host	−0.1

Table 4. Successful red action rewards for blue agents.

Agent	Host	Action	Blue Reward
Red	Operational Server	Impact	−10
Blue	Any	Restore	−1

2.4. Reinforcement Learning-Based Blue Agent Training Methods

Most of existing RL-based blue agents for ACOs can be categorized as follows [26]:

- Single agents;
- Hierarchical agents;
- Ensembles.

Single agents are straightforward, involving the training of one agent using RL to defend against various types of red agents and deploying only one blue agent in a networked system [27]. Hierarchical agents are more complex, typically including an agent that selects another agent to provide an action based on the type of red agent attacking the network [28]. Similarly, ensemble approaches involve the training of multiple agents, each receiving the network's state and providing an action based on that state. The most commonly reported action is ultimately executed. Several existing blue agents based on ensemble approaches are discussed in [26]. For existing work in ACOs, the following conclusions can be drawn as per [26].

- Hierarchical agents generally perform the best, followed by ensemble agents and single agents.
- The PPO algorithm has been noted for its superior performance.
- Overall, RL-based methods show better generalization capabilities compared to non-RL-based approaches.

2.5. Discussion

Training generalized blue agents to support ACOs is a challenging task, but its importance has driven several efforts to develop RL methods that can produce such agents. Hierarchical RL methods have shown superior performance compared to ensemble-based RL and single-agent RL methods. However, hierarchical methods require the training and deployment of multiple blue agents within a networked system, which is also true for ensemble-based RL methods. This makes these approaches relatively resource-intensive and can result in longer real-time decision-making processes due to the involvement of multiple agents. Therefore, there is a need to further explore the possibilities of training a blue agent that not only possesses generalized capabilities but also requires only a single agent to be deployed in the networked system.

3. Framework for Generic Blue Agent Training

To support ACOs, we present the details of the proposed framework. This framework integrates reinforcement learning (RL) and supervised machine learning to train a single generalized blue agent capable of defending against various red agents. Figure 4 illustrates the training framework for the generalized blue agent. The components of this framework are discussed below. The framework consists of the following components:

- HP tuning for the training of a blue agent against a red agent using RL;
- Training of blue agents against red agents using RL;
- Collection of data with the trained blue agents;
- Randomization of the collected data;
- HP tuning for supervised learning to train a generalized blue agent;
- Training of a generalized blue agent using a supervised machine learning algorithm;
- Testing and deployment of the generalized blue agent.




Figure 4. Proposed framework for generalized blue agent.

3.1. Framework's Component Details

3.1.1. Hyper-Parameter Tuning for Blue Agent Training Using Reinforcement Learning

In the proposed framework, initially, a separate blue agent must be trained against each possible red agent. If there are N red agents in a system, N blue agents need to be trained, with each blue agent tailored to a specific red agent. In machine learning, it is well known that tuning HPs can enhance a model's performance. For HP tuning, a range of values is explored for the different HPs associated with a given RL algorithm. The following strategy is used for HP tuning:

- Create an RL-based learning environment that includes various entities (hosts, servers, firewalls, switches, and routers), along with a blue agent and the corresponding red agent.
- Provide a range of values for all possible HPs.
- Utilize an HP tuning library, such as Optuna [29], for RL to find the best HPs for the training of the blue agent against a red agent.
- Store the optimal HP values obtained in the previous step.
- Repeat the above steps for each blue agent that needs to be trained.

3.1.2. Reinforcement Learning-Based Blue Agent Training

After identifying the optimal HPs for each blue agent, the agents must be trained against their respective red agents. This training requires the creation of a learning environment that simulates a real network scenario, including both blue and red agents. The RL algorithm used to train a blue agent should employ the optimal HPs identified for the specific red agent. The blue agent is then trained over a large number of RL training steps against the red agent. This process needs to be repeated for the training of each blue agent.

3.1.3. Data Collection—Observations and Action Tuples

The proposed framework employs supervised learning to train a generic blue agent for ACOs. Since supervised learning requires training data, the framework includes a data collection mechanism. Initially, a separate blue agent is trained against each red agent using RL, allowing the blue agent to learn the best possible actions based on the current network state/observations against its respective red agent. Similarly, the generic blue agent needs to learn optimal actions based on various network states and also identify the type of red agent attacking the network.

To train the generic blue agent, the framework collects a sufficient number of observation–action tuples by running scenarios where each trained blue agent defends against its corresponding red agent. This process should be repeated for all trained blue agents as described in Section 3.1.2. The goal is to gather enough observation–action tuples from each trained blue agent to compile a comprehensive dataset. This dataset can then be used to train a generic blue agent capable of identifying the type of red agent attacking the network and learning to take appropriate actions. The collected observation–action tuples should be stored for further processing. Algorithm 1 outlines the data collection process.

Algorithm 1: Collection of Observation–Action Tuples

```

1 Input: blue_agents, red_agents;
2 Output: list_of_obs_actions_files;
3 list_length = len(blue_agents);
4 i = 0;
5 for i < list_length do
6   new_tuples_file = create_file();
7   i ++;
8   episode = 0;
9   env = create_aco_env(blue_agents[i], red_agents[i]);
10  model = load_trained_model(blue_agents[i], red_agents[i]);
11  terminated = False;
12  obs = model.reset(env);
13  for episode < MAX_EPISODES do
14    while not terminated do
15      action = model.predict(obs);
16      prev_obs = obs;
17      obs, reward, terminated, info = env.step(action);
18      new_tuples_file(prev_obs, action);
19    end
20  end
21  list_of_obs_actions_files.add(new_tuples_file);
22  new_tuples_file.close();
23 end
24 return list_of_obs_actions_files;

```

3.1.4. Randomizing Sequencing of Collected Data

The data collection module gathers data sequentially, with each blue agent being tested against the red agent it was trained to counter, in order to collect observation and action tuples. To prepare the data for supervised learning, all collected data must be consolidated into a single source file. Once stored, the data sequence needs to be randomized; otherwise, records for each blue agent will appear in order, which could negatively affect the performance of the supervised machine learning algorithm. For instance, a neural network might not train effectively for blue agents whose data are at the beginning of the file. Figure 5 illustrates the process of data preparation to train a generic blue agent using supervised learning.




Figure 5. Preparing data for supervised learning.

3.1.5. Supervised Learning—Hyper-Parameter Optimization

Once the data are prepared for the training of a generic blue agent using supervised learning, the next step is to use the data to find the optimal HPs for a suitable supervised machine learning algorithm, such as multi-layer perceptrons, support vector machines, or random forests. Depending on the chosen algorithm, different HPs need to be tuned, such as the number of hidden layers, the activation function, and the learning rate for

multi-layer perceptrons. Existing machine learning libraries like SciKit-Learn provide APIs for HP tuning, such as GridSearchCV and BayesSearchCV. The process for finding the optimal HPs can be summarized as follows:

- Select a suitable supervised machine learning algorithm.
- Choose a reasonable range of values for the different HPs associated with the selected algorithm.
- Provide the supervised machine learning method, the list of HPs and their value ranges, and the number of cross-validation folds to an API that searches for the best HP values.
- Use the selected library's API, such as the fit method in SciKit-Learn, to obtain the best HP values.

3.1.6. Training a Generic Blue Agent

By now, most of the necessary components for the training of a generic blue agent using a supervised machine learning algorithm are in place, thanks to the preceding modules of the framework. These components include the following: (i) training data, (ii) data pre-processing, and (iii) optimized HP values for the selected supervised machine learning algorithms. However, testing data are also needed for evaluation of the trained blue agent. To address this, the framework proposes partitioning of the collected data into a training set and a testing set, typically allocating 80% for training and 20% for testing. Given that the data are collected using blue agents trained through RL, a substantial amount of training and testing data can be gathered. The generic blue agent is then trained using the training dataset and the optimized HP values with a supervised machine learning algorithm.

3.1.7. Testing and Deployment of the Generic Blue Agent

After training of the generic blue agent, it must be tested using the test dataset. If the agent's performance is acceptable after testing, it can be deployed in a real system. In the real system, the agent periodically receives the system's state and suggests an appropriate action based on this state. If necessary, the action is executed by a script.

3.2. Custom Variational Autoencoder for Generic Blue Agent Training

The supervised learning component of the proposed framework uses data obtained from interactions between blue agents and red agents. These data are collected during scenarios where blue agents counteract red agents in specific settings, such as a network topology. Even slight changes in network topology can alter the observation vector. Additionally, since the framework's supervised learning part uses data collected from different types of red agents, different observation vectors might be mapped to the same action. This can negatively impact the framework's performance. To address this, we extend the proposed framework by incorporating a method to map observation vectors to a particular distribution, aiming to handle variations in observation vectors and minimize instances where the same observation vector is mapped to different actions. This method is a variation of a variational autoencoder (VAE) and is referred to as the VAE variant, or VAE-V for short.

In VAE, input data are typically mapped to a normal distribution with the aim of limiting the values that latent variables can take. This process is stochastic in nature, as the values taken by latent variables are sampled from a normal distribution. Once a generic blue agent is trained, it is meant to carry out actions. In our autonomous cyber system, actions are represented as discrete numbers. In a nutshell, in the autonomous cyber system, the generic blue agent expects a vector of observations and outputs a discrete number corresponding to a certain action that needs to be executed. Hence, the problem is

exactly analogous to a classification problem. Here, a custom VAE is designed that handles the classification problem in the context of ACOs. The following steps summarize the VAE-V functionality:

- Each observation tuple is mapped to two latent vectors of dimension N representing the mean (μ) and log variance (σ) of a standard normal distribution.
- For each latent variable, a point is sampled from a standard normal distribution using the corresponding μ and σ .
- Latent variables are fed to the decoder to produce an action for a blue agent (the output of this VAE-V is a scalar value).

Figure 6 shows the designed VAE-V model for generic blue agent training. The encoder part of the model has an input layer (*input_2*), two dense layers (*dense_5* and *dense_6*), and two further dense layers (*z_mean* and *z_log_var*) to produce a latent vector of dimension 18 (a latent dimension of 18 is chosen after hyper-parameter optimization). The input layer expects a vector of length 52 (in CybORG, the observation tuple consists of 52 items). The decoder part of VAE-V comprises two dense layers (*dense_7* and *dense_8*) and an output layer (*dense_9*). It should be noted here that the numbers of units in *dense_7* and *dense_8* are exactly the same as in *dense_6* and *dense_5*, respectively. The number of units in the output layer (*dense_9*) is 145 (the total number of actions defined for blue agents in CybORG). As VAE-V is designed for a classification problem in the context of ACOs, the *softmax* activation function is used in the output layer to select an action with the highest probability. VAE-V is trained by tuning the latent space dimension.




Figure 6. Custom VAE model for generic blue agent training.

4. Performance Evaluation

For performance evaluation, the following types of agents are used:

- A blue agent specifically trained against the *b_line* red agent, referred to as *BL*;
- A blue agent specifically trained against the *red_meander* red agent, referred to as *RED*;
- *BL* retrained against the *red_meander* red agent, referred to as *BL-RED*;
- *RED* retrained against the *b_line* red agent, referred to as *RED-BL*;
- A proposed framework-based blue agent that uses a Multi-layer Perceptron approach, referred to as *MLP*.
- A proposed framework-based blue agent that uses a Support Vector Machine approach, referred to as *SVM*;
- A proposed framework-based blue agent that uses VAE-V, referred to as *VAE-V*;
- A hierarchical super agent, a blue agent that first determines the kind of attacking red agent, then launches the specifically trained blue agent for that particular red agent. Variants of the hierarchical blue agent that misclassify the attacking agent by 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% are referred to as *HA5*, *HA10*, *HA15*, and *HA20*, respectively.

The proposed framework integrates RL with supervised learning. To gather data for supervised learning, each trained blue agent is run against the red agent it was trained to oppose, collecting observation–action tuples for further learning. Before we trained each agent, we carefully tuned relevant hyperparameters, Table 5 lists the parameters and the range of values explored, Table 6 shows the optimal hyperparameter values when training against each opponent. For each agent, 10,000 tuples were collected. We employ multi-layer perceptron and support vector machine algorithms for supervised learning, though the framework is adaptable to any supervised learning algorithm. HP optimization for both multi-layer perceptron and support vector machine algorithms was conducted using Bayesian search. For *SVM*, the HPs considered were *C*, *gamma*, and *kernel*, with optimal values found to be 10.9975, 4.501669×10^{-6} , and *linear*, respectively. For *MLP*, the HPs considered were the number of hidden layers, activation function, solver, learning rate, and alpha, with optimal values determined to be 10, *tanh*, *lbfgs*, *invscaling*, and 0.01542674, respectively. For *VAE-V*, the *ReLU* activation function is used in each layer, except for the output layer, which uses the *Softmax* activation function. The loss function is a combination of categorical cross-entropy and Kullback–Leibler divergence. The latent vector comprises of 18 elements.

We deployed our approach in CybORG, which features two distinct red agents/attackers. Each blue agent used for performance evaluation is trained for 100,000 steps. For the various performance evaluation scenarios considered here, proximal policy optimization (PPO) is utilized as the RL algorithm, as previous studies have shown its superior performance and generalization ability compared to other RL algorithms like DQN [5]. The agents are trained using the networking scenario illustrated in Figure 3. In each scenario, every trained blue agent is evaluated over 100 episodes against the red agents.

Our performance evaluation experiments utilize two different episode lengths: 100 steps and 50 steps. By varying the episode length, we aim to assess the trained agents' performance over both shorter and longer periods. This approach helps to highlight how the trained blue agents perform initially and how they adjust their behavior as the scenario progresses. It should also be noted that blue agents do not receive rewards but are penalized at each step. They incur heavier penalties for successful actions of red agents. Therefore, an effective blue agent is one that successfully prevents the red agent's actions, resulting in a total reward closer to zero.

Table 5. Hyper-parameters and value ranges.

Hyper-Parameter	Range of Values
Batch Size	[8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512]
No. of Steps	[8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048]
Gamma	[0.9, 0.95, 0.98, 0.99, 0.995, 0.999, 0.9999]
Learning Rate	log range (1×10^{-5} , 1)
Entropy Coefficient	log range (0.00000001, 0.1)
Clip Range	[0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4]
No. of Epochs	[1, 5, 10, 20]
GAE Lambda	[0.8, 0.9, 0.92, 0.95, 0.98, 0.99, 1.0]
Max Gradient Norm	[0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 2, 5]
VF Coefficient	[0, 1]
Activation Function	[tanh, relu, elu, leaky relu]
Neural Network Architecture	[(pi = [64, 64], vf = [64, 64]), (pi = [256, 256], vf = [256, 256])]

Table 6. Tuned hyper-parameter values for blue agents.

Hyper-Parameter	b_Line Red Agent	Red Meander Agent
Batch Size	8	256
No. of Steps	128	1024
Gamma	0.9	0.95
Learning Rate	0.00018937	0.00373109
Entropy Coefficient	$1.032461073 \times 10^{-5}$	0.017615274
Clip Range	0.3	0.3
No. of Epochs	10	10
GAE Lambda	0.8	0.8
Max Gradient Norm	0.5	5
VF Coefficient	0.09187	0.73582
Activation Function	relu	tanh
Neural Network Architecture	pi = [256, 256], vf = [256, 256]	pi = [64, 64], vf = [64, 64]

4.1. Results Based on Training Topology

Figure 7 displays the mean total reward, along with the 95% confidence interval (CI), for different blue agents against *b_line* and *red_meander* in 100-step episodes. When the network is attacked by *b_line*, agents trained using the proposed framework show better mean rewards compared to other agents, except BL. Notably, our VAE-V agent achieves the highest mean reward—even better than that of BL, the agent specifically trained for *b_line*. However, this difference is not statistically significant. The REDagent trained specifically for *red_meander* performs poorly against *b_line*, and this difference is statistically significant. Similarly, BL-RED and RED-BL perform worse against *b_line*. BL-RED performs worse than RED-BL because RED-BL is an agent retrained for *b_line* after having initially been trained for *red_meander*. Consequently, it demonstrates a better mean reward compared to BL-RED, which was originally trained for *b_line*, then retrained for *red_meander*. This indicates that the agent forgets features of the *b_line* red agent while retraining. All HA agents show lower mean rewards compared to BL, but the differences in performance are not statistically significant.




Figure 7. Performance comparison using training network topology—100-step episode.

For agents’ performance against (*red_meander*), the RED agent achieves the best mean reward, as it is specifically trained for *red_meander*. VAE-V and MLP agents, trained using the proposed framework, show similar performance to RED. BL, BL-RED, and RED-BL perform worse compared to RED, with the difference being statistically significant. Notably, RED-BL exhibits a lower mean reward compared to BL-RED, highlighting that retraining of an agent leads to the forgetting of features of the red agent it was originally trained against. HA agents also perform worse compared to RED, and as the error rate in selecting the correct blue agent increases, the performance difference becomes statistically significant between HAs and RED. VAE-V shows a better mean reward compared to HAs, and MLP also demonstrates a better mean reward compared to some HAs.

Table 7 shows the total mean reward demonstrated by different agents considering both red agents. MLP and VAE-V exhibit superior total mean rewards, with SVM also outperforming most other agents. The overall best performance is achieved by VAE-V with a score of -110.90 , highlighted in bold. The proposed framework trains a single blue agent to handle both *b_line* and *red_meander*. The results in Table 7 indicate that agents trained using the proposed framework possess generalizability, enabling them to effectively handle both types of red agents.

Table 7. Total mean reward—100-step episode.

Agent Type	BL	RED	BL-RED	RED-BL	MLP	SVM
Total Mean Reward	-140.88	-122.96	-151.33	-198.75	-117.70	-124.61
Agent Type	VAE-V	HA5	HA10	HA15	HA20	
Total Mean Reward	-110.90	-117.60	-123.10	-126.60	-127.43	

Previously, all results were based on episodes of 100 steps. Here, we present results from another set of experiments with an episode length of 50 steps. Prior findings have shown that retraining agents is counterproductive, so retrained agents are not considered in this analysis. Figure 8 shows the mean total rewards, along with 95% CIs, for different blue agents. The performance of the blue agents against *b_line* is similar to that shown in Figure 7. VAE-V demonstrates the best mean reward, followed by MLP and SVM. However, the performance difference between the blue agents trained using the proposed framework and BL is not statistically significant. The RED agent shows the worst performance against *b_line*, as it is specifically trained against *red_meander*. Most HAs also demonstrate worse mean rewards compared to BL and the blue agents trained using the proposed framework, with the differences in performance for VAE-V and HA20 being statistically significant. The blue agents’ performance against *red_meander* is, again, similar to what is shown

in Figure 7. The RED agent demonstrates the best performance, with VAE-V and MLP showing comparable performance to RED, as the differences are not statistically significant. BL performs the worst, since it is trained for *b_line*. The mean reward for HAs decreases as the percentage error in selecting the appropriate blue agent increases, although their performance is generally similar to RED.

Table 8 lists the mean total rewards as demonstrated by the blue agents against both red agents. Among the blue agents trained using the proposed framework, VAE-V achieves the highest total mean reward, indicated by the bold font. HA5 achieves the same total mean reward, while MLP and SVM also exhibit comparable total mean rewards. The results in Table 8 indicate that agents trained with the proposed framework exhibit a certain degree of generalizability, enabling them to effectively handle both types of red agents using a single blue agent.




Figure 8. Performance comparison using training network topology—50-step episode.

Table 8. Total mean reward—50-step episode.

Agent Type	BL	RED	MLP	SVM	VAE-V
Total Mean Reward	-57.4	-58.83	-52.39	-52.92	-50.4
Agent Type	HA5	HA10	HA15	HA20	
Total Mean Reward	-50.4	-52.3	-54.0	-55.4	

4.2. Varying the Network Topology

To delve deeper into the generalization capability of the proposed framework, we examine it using network topologies distinct from the network topology employed to train blue agents.

4.2.1. Topology 2 Results

Figure 9 depicts the network topology utilized for assessing the efficacy of various blue agent training methods. Henceforth, this topology will be referred to as “Topology 2”. Compared to the original topology used to train blue agents, the difference here is that *UserHost3* and *UserHost4* have been moved from *subnet1* to *subnet2*. This change should not significantly affect the existing red agents, *b_line* and *red_meander*, for the following reasons: (i) *b_line* knows the previous network topology required to reach critical resources and impact the operational server, and moving *UserHost3* and *UserHost4* does not affect the route to the operational server. (ii) *red_meander* systematically discovers the network topology, so its behavior should not be significantly impacted. Consequently, no changes were made to the existing red agent scripts. The blue agents trained using the proposed

framework should be the ones potentially affected by this change, as the number of hosts in is decreased in one subnet and increased in the other.




Figure 9. Network Topology 2.

Figure 10 shows the mean reward achieved by different blue agents against the red agents. The results in Figure 10 were collected over 100 episodes, each consisting of 100 steps. Against *b_line*, VAE-V demonstrates the highest mean reward among the evaluated blue agents, followed by SVM, MLP, BL, and HA5. However, the differences in performance are not statistically significant. The RED agent shows the worst performance. Against *red_meander*, VAE-V, again, achieves the best mean reward, followed by SVM, RED, and HA5. Similarly, the performance differences are not statistically significant. BL performs the worst against *red_meander*.




Figure 10. Performance comparison using Network Topology 2—100-step episode.

Table 9 lists the total mean reward demonstrated by the blue agents considering both red agents, showing that VAE-V achieves the highest total mean reward (indicated by the bold face), followed by SVM, HA5, and MLP. Comparing Tables 7 and 9 reveals the following:

- The performance of all blue agents trained solely with reinforcement learning (BL, RED, and all HAs) is deteriorated in this modified environment.
- The performance of the single blue agent trained with the proposed framework either deteriorates (MLP and VAE-V) or, in the case of SVM, actually demonstrates a slightly improved total mean reward.

In summary, combining RL with supervised learning outperforms other defensive agents against the *red_meander* agent, while most defensive agents trained using the proposed framework exhibit comparable performance against the *b_line* agent when evaluated on a network topology different from the one used during training. Overall, our approach demonstrates the best performance, with the performance of BL, RED, and hierarchical

agents showing a more pronounced decline. These findings indicate that the proposed framework for defensive agent training possesses a degree of generalizability to variations in network topology.

Figure 11 presents the mean reward demonstrated by the evaluated blue agents for a shorted episode length, i.e., 50 steps. Overall, results are similar to those for 100-step episode, i.e., VAE-V demonstrates the best performance (indicated in bold face), followed by HA5, MLP, and SVM. BL and RED demonstrate the worst performance, as also shown in Table 10. It is important to note here that VAE-V demonstrates statistically better mean rewards compared to RED against *red_meander*. When agents’ performance for 50-step episodes using Topology 2 with the topology used for agents’ training, the performance of blue agents trained through the proposed framework is improved against the *red_meander* agent but is slightly deteriorated against the *b_line* agent. Most of the HAs performance is slightly deteriorated in this case.

Table 9. Total mean reward—100-step episode (Topology 2).

Agent Type	BL	RED	MLP	SVM	VAE-V
Total Mean Reward	−148	−132.0	−122.2	−119	−116.45
Agent Type	HA5	HA10	HA15	HA20	
Total Mean Reward	−120.08	−126.14	−128.32	−130.5	

Table 10. Total mean reward—50-step episode (Topology 2).

Agent Type	BL	RED	MLP	SVM	VAE-V
Total Mean Reward	−61	−61.1	−54.43	−55.4	−50.3
Agent Type	HA5	HA10	HA15	HA20	
Total Mean Reward	−50.38	−52.69	−54.9	−56.40	




Figure 11. Performance comparison using Network Topology 2—50-step episode.

4.2.2. Topology 3 Results

Figure 12 shows another network topology utilized for assessing the efficacy of various blue agent training methods. Hereafter, this topology is referred to as “Topology 3”. In Topology 3, *UserHost0* is moved to the *enterprise* subnet. Since red agents access the network through *UserHost0*, this change can impact the performance of the *b_line* red agent, as its information about the network topology is now inaccurate. However, *red_meander* discovers the network topology as part of the attack; hence, with this change, its overall approach should not be impacted. In general, the red agents are rule-based, and they consider the host when they decide about the next action to take; hence, their performance

should not be significantly impacted with this change. Additionally, the host that both red agents use to access the network is now closer to their target, so the red agents may not perform poorly or could even perform better. Topology 3 is more challenging for the trained blue agents because the red agents now need fewer actions to compromise the operational server. Therefore, Topology 3 can provide more insights into the generalizability of the trained blue agents with regard to network topology variations.

Figure 13 presents the performance of various blue agents against *b_line* and *red_meander* over Topology 3. MLP shows a statistically significantly higher mean reward compared to all other trained blue agents evaluated in this study. Notably, all blue agents trained using the proposed framework demonstrate a statistically significantly better mean reward compared to BL, the blue agent specifically trained for *b_line*. All variants of HAs show a higher mean reward compared to BL and RED; however, this difference is not statistically significant. Against *red_meander*, SVM and VAE-V exhibit statistically significantly better performance compared to RED, the blue agent specifically trained for *red_meander*. Furthermore, SVM shows statistically significantly better performance compared to all other evaluated blue agents in this scenario, while MLP demonstrates a comparatively poor performance, albeit slightly better than that of the blue agents trained solely via RL. Overall, against both red agents, the blue agents trained through the proposed framework showed a better mean reward compared to all other evaluated blue agents. Two out of three blue agents trained with the proposed framework achieve a statistically significantly higher mean reward compared to pure RL blue agents. Table 11 shows the total mean reward exhibited by the blue agents while considering both red agents. SVM exhibits the highest mean reward (shown in bold face), followed by VAE-E and MLP.




Figure 12. Network Topology 3.

Comparing Figure 7 with Figure 13 reveals the following about the trained blue agents' performance against the red agents:

- When the attacking red agent is *b_line*, BL and VAE-V demonstrate similar performance in both topologies. SVM, VAE-V, RED, and all HAs demonstrate better performance in Topology 3.
- When the attacking red agent is *red_meander*, all blue agents' performance deteriorates in Topology 3.

Figure 14 shows the mean reward of the blue agents against both red agents over a 50-step episode. Generally, the trends in Figure 14 are similar to those in Figure 13. The agents trained using the proposed framework exhibit better mean rewards, with instances of statistically significantly better performance compared to a blue agent specifically trained against a particular red agent. Similarly, the trends in Table 12 mostly mirror those in Table 12, where SVM demonstrates the highest total mean reward (shown in bold face), followed by VAE-V and MLP. Variants of HAs show the lowest total mean reward when considering their performance against both red agents. Comparing Figure 14 with Figure 8

reveals that, by and large, the trained blue agents demonstrate similar performance for both topologies. Also, there are instances where agents trained using the proposed framework demonstrate a higher mean reward, i.e., better performance.




Figure 13. Performance comparison using Network Topology 3—100-step episode.




Figure 14. Performance comparison using Network Topology 3—50-step episode.

Table 11. Total mean reward—100-Step episode (Topology 3).

Agent Type	BL	RED	MLP	SVM	VAE-V
Total Mean Reward	-133.3	-136.61	-131.10	-117.55	-123.24
Agent Type	HA5	HA10	HA15	HA20	
Total Mean Reward	-131.74	-136.64	-138.01	-139.93	

Table 12. Total mean reward—50-step episode (Topology 3).

Agent Type	BL	RED	MLP	SVM	VAE-V
Total Mean Reward	-55.49	-54.6	-50.83	-48.77	-51.24
Agent Type	HA5	HA10	HA15	HA20	
Total Mean Reward	-57.98	-59.45	-60.4	-61.7	

In general, our single blue agents perform comparably to blue agents specifically trained against particular red agents, if not achieving superior performance. This indicates that the proposed framework effectively develops a generic blue agent with regard to specific attackers. Since network topologies can vary from one network to another, it is crucial for a blue agent to adapt its behavior as the network topology changes. Therefore,

we evaluated blue agents on network topologies different from those used for training (the total number of nodes in the network remained the same, but the number of nodes in each subnet was altered). Across these different network topologies, the blue agents trained with the proposed framework demonstrate statistically significantly better performance compared to other evaluated blue agents. This underscores the generalizability of the proposed framework in adapting to specific network topology changes.

5. Conclusions

The objective of our work is to train a single, generic blue agent that is independent of any attacking red agent and, to some extent, independent of the network topology as well. The proposed framework combines RL with supervised learning. A variant of the framework uses a custom-built VAE in the supervised learning phase. To explore alternate methods that may result in a generic blue agent, the option of retraining an existing blue agent against another type of red agent is also explored. Our results show that the proposed framework for generic blue agent training does result in a blue agent that possesses generic features in terms of an attacking red agent. Retraining an existing blue agent against another type of red agent tends to result in poor performance. The VAE-based version of the proposed framework demonstrates the best overall performance, i.e., achieves higher total rewards. It also demonstrates strong performance when evaluated in scenarios with network topologies that differ from the one used during agent training. Also, all studied supervised learning methods perform strongly compared to blue agents trained solely using reinforcement learning. In fact, in one scenario (Topology 3), the use of an SVM outperforms the VAE-based version. SVM is also more effective than MLP in scenarios where the network topology is changed. This indicates that using SVM in the supervised learning phase of the proposed framework may result in a blue agent that is more topology-agnostic.

For future work, we will explore the most suitable approach to achieve generalized strong performance in more depth. In particular, we will apply our approach to the recently launched Cage Challenge 4 [30]. This challenge has a number of interesting features. During both training and evaluation, each time the environment resets, a new scenario is created. The overall network topology in terms of networks, subnets, and physical connectivity remains the same. However, the number of user hosts and servers in each subnet varies, in addition to the number of deployed services on each user host and server. Also, the network experiences multiple operational phases. Different phases support different communication patterns based on pre-configured firewall rules. The reward function varies based on a device's priority during a given phase. Last but not least, Cage Challenge 4 models a multi-agent environment, where, collectively, five blue agents can be trained to defend the complete network, which differs significantly from the single-defender scenario we studied here. As part of our framework, when a more complex red agent is introduced, the RL-based defender agent is trained against the new red strategy. Subsequently, our proposed data collection approach and supervised learning leverage the training of a generic defender capable of addressing a broader range of red agent behaviors. This mechanism allows the framework to generalize across increasingly complex adversarial strategies, supporting scalability to larger and more diverse environments.

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Abbreviations

A_t	Action chosen by an agent at time t
ACOs	Autonomous Cyber Operations
CybORG	Cyber Operations Research Gym
DRL	Deep Reinforcement Learning
DQN	Deep Q Network
HAX	Hierarchical Agent with x% misclassification
HP	Hyper-Parameter
IoT	Internet of Things
MLP	Multi-Layer Perceptron
PPO	Proximal Policy Optimization
R_t	Reward received by an agent at time t
RL	Reinforcement Learning
S_t	Observed environment state at time t
SVM	Support Vector Machine
VAE	Variational Autoencoder
VAE-V	VAE Variant

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