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**Forget Aristotle: Alexander the Great and
the military origins of modern political
organisation**

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In the thirteenth century Western Europe rediscovered Aristotle. Very soon, and thanks largely to the scholarship of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle entered the pantheon of classical originators of Western ideas. Indeed, Aristotle's views on government became the basis of an intellectual revolution, supported by the Church, that played up the moral value of political life. Yet, the classical texts also contained a second tradition. This second tradition is a crucial cornerstone of our thinking about political organisation today. The books that contained the literary side of this tradition were not works of philosophy, but histories of great deeds. These histories spoke to the concerns, prejudices and goals of Early Modern state-builders, and led directly not only to the idea of the modern state, but also to its cosmopolitan rivals. Modern warfare and human rights; bureaucratic government and multiculturalism; the World Trade Organisation and Oxfam: all trace their roots to this, the most persuasive and long-lasting legacy of the ancient world. So persuasive are its doctrines that we have ceased to see them as an invention of a time and place.

Texts on the history of political theory often stress that there is a sharp break between Aristotle and the later Roman and medieval approaches to politics.¹ Yet, despite this realisation, this discontinuity is skipped across with alacrity. For most political theorists Aristotle gives way cleanly to the more universalist ideas associated with imperial Rome, the Church triumphant, and some even cut straight to Machiavelli. Very little attention is given to the political theory of empire constructed by Alexander the Great, his biographers and successors, despite the fact that it was Alexander who finally abolished the cosy closed world associated with Aristotle's ideal. Alexander had been Aristotle's pupil, and Aristotle's great paean to the perfection of the ideal *polis*,² his *Politics*, was written at a time when the new Macedonian empire was rewriting the rules and categories of politics. This article argues that it is Alexander, not Aristotle, that is the founder of the western political tradition, and that the idea of empire, and imperialist political organisation, forms the core of what it means to be western. We can trace this idea back to the Macedonians and Romans. In this sense, the 'classical Greeks' are an aberration in the development of the idea of the West. More controversially, it also implies that the idea of the West is at its roots an imperial and military legacy. Just as capitalism in Marx made socialism possible, so rampant military imperialism has also given us cosmopolitanism and racial tolerance.

My argument is that it was the political organisation of the Macedonian military, developed by Philip of Macedon, that formed the basis of Alexander the Great's notion of empire. This, in turn, formed the template of future Near Eastern and Mediterranean polities; and through the influential histories of Arrian, Quintus Curtius, Caesar, Plutarch, Tacitus and Livy became the model for European state creation from the high Middle Ages onwards. Aristotle's politics was based upon civic virtue, while

¹ See, for example, Sabine and Thorson, (1973: 141): 'In the history of political philosophy the death of Aristotle in 322 marks the close of an era, as the life of his great pupil... marks the beginning of a new era in politics... The failure of the city-state is drawn like a sharp line across the history of political thought, whereas from this date forward its continuity is unbroken down to our own day.' Despite this Sabine and Thorson never address Alexander's ideas and achievements directly.

² The *polis*, usually rendered into English by the unhelpful phrase city-state, was the basic political community of the classical Greeks. It was based around a community of small farmers, a face-to-face system of government, a citizen militia and aspired to self-sufficiency. I will discuss this in more detail in the section on Aristotle.

Alexander's relied on an instrumental rationality that had its roots in Macedonian military doctrine. Position and authority were judged by their effectiveness. Equally, imperial policies required a sophisticated use and understanding of inter-cultural relations. From this came Alexander's notions of cosmopolitanism, which influenced the Stoics and Roman imperial policy. Opponents of militarism, like the Stoic Zeno and later pacifists, looked not to Aristotle's territorially limited vision, but rather to the instrumental rationality and cosmopolitanism of their militaristic adversaries. The Macedonian system became the template for empire in the ancient world, and was adopted consciously and explicitly by the Parthians, Sassanid Persians, Carthaginians and Romans. The Romans and Persians guaranteed that these imperial practices were transferred to the Muslim and Christian worlds, and we clearly see a firm Macedonian influence (through its imitators and developers) in the writings of Ibn Khaldun in the fourteenth century and Francesco Guicciardini in the fifteenth. By the sixteenth century European writers were using the histories of empire as a template for the reform and development of what was to become the state. In this process Alexander and Caesar became the exemplars of the perfect and just ruler. Alfonso V of Aragon even claimed to have been cured of an illness by reading Quintus Curtius Rufus' *History of Alexander* (Heckel, 1984: 14) While Tacitus and his histories were more commonly quoted, especially in relation to the relevance of the rule of Tiberius for sixteenth century state-builders, it is still to Alexander that we owe the first clear development of this idea of empire in the western canon.

In sum, Aristotle's ideas are left behind. Alexander's greatest impact on the world was to reformulate the major political debate about the right way to live. Aristotle's ideas remain a yearning amongst conservatives. It becomes a living fossil that is picked up by advocates of Senatorial class power in late Republican Rome, but is unable to survive the populist (and military-based) revolution of Caesar. It is picked up again by the Church at the end of the Middle Ages as a shield against the new humanism. Again, it fails to prevent the popularity of a political doctrine associated with the historian Tacitus. Even Machiavelli's attempt to revive the civic virtue of the Roman Senatorial party broke against the imperial policies of Spain and France. Thus, the military revolution at the close of the Greek classical age is crucial to an understanding of modern political organisation. In order to develop this argument I have divided this paper up into three sections. The first looks at Aristotle's legacy, and is intended to show why he fits poorly with the development of our own western tradition of organisation. The second section looks at the development of the Macedonian military model, concentrating on the reforms of Philip. The third traces the Macedonian systems' move from militarised kingdom to empire, and the profound changes this had on political organisation. Key here is the development of a Western ideology of empire.

ARISTOTLE'S XENOPHOBIC IDEAL

Aristotle was a polymath, with interests that stretched from ethics and politics to biology, estate management and midwifery. In a sense this is not strange, since for Aristotle there was a unity amongst all these subjects, linked to the divine, which holds the cosmos in order. As befits a man who believed in a static cosmic order, Aristotle was

a conservative. While criticising many practices of his own time, he was nevertheless largely happy with the institutions of his day; and like many conservatives saw political institutions of the best kind as forming a sort of organic whole (Ar. *Pol*, Bk VII, ch. 8). Although there was an interconnectedness of things, this did not mean that each of the parts were equal. Indeed, there is a strict hierarchy of disciplines, as well as institutions. Key to our analysis is his view that ethics is subordinate to politics (Ar. *NE*, Bk I, ch. 3). Now, it should be pointed out at the start that Aristotle's notion of the idea of politics is different to our own. The word *Politeia*, which also forms the root of the original title for Aristotle's *Politics*: *politikos*, refers to a collection of people forming a community, and implies that they are linked together by a constitution. In this sense it is closer to the latin *civitas*, from which we get our word city. This is important. Aristotle is writing about the life of a city. Yet, while to us a city means any sprawling mass of urban growth, to Aristotle it meant a set of social relations that could only exist under certain conditions. It comes closer, therefore, to the definition of town or city found in the United States, where it implies self-government, rather than size or contiguity of urbanisation.

Aristotle's own definition of a *politeia* comes in the crucial Book VII of *The Politics*:

Here then we have ready to hand the best definition of a city: it must have a population large enough to cater for all the needs of a self-sufficient existence, but not so large that it cannot be easily supervised (Ar. *Pol*, Bk VII, ch. 4).

This notion of balance fits in with Aristotle's own ethics, where every virtue is a mean between two extremist vices (Ar. *NE*, Bk II, chs 6-7), and it also outlines the purposes of the city. It is to provide the citizen with all he³ wants in terms of physical needs, but also be well governed in order to satisfy the citizen's moral and intellectual needs. This latter set of needs involves living the 'good life', which is defined as one that is spiritually happy.⁴ So what should the *politeia* look like? Here a discussion of the upper limit is important for our purposes. A *politeia* becomes ungovernable when its population reaches such a size that the citizens can no longer know each other by sight. At this stage the election of individuals to the various magistracies becomes unworkable, as the vast bulk of the electorate is unable to know if the candidate they are voting for really is the best for the job. Similarly, military command becomes too complex, as no one *polemarch* (the magistrate in charge of leadership in war) can make themselves heard to all the soldiery. Finally, in a large city, where people do not know each other, it is easy for foreign residents to pass themselves off as citizens – a problem that only has meaning when we take into account Aristotle's racial theories, discussed below (Ar. *Pol*, Bk VII, ch. 4). Earlier Aristotle had classed Babylon as a 'nation' rather than a city, because it was unable to form a coherent institutional unit. He points out that after its capture (presumably by Alexander) parts of Babylon were still unaware of it two days later (AR. *Pol*, Bk III, ch. 3).

³ Aristotle only referred to men as full participating citizens.

⁴ This issue of the true nature of happiness is covered in Book I of *The Nicomachean Ethics*.

This all leads to why Aristotle sees this issue of scale as important. The *Politeia* has an ethical purpose, and that purpose can only be served if it is well governed. He begins his *Nicomachean Ethics* with the famous line ‘It is thought that every activity... has for its object the attainment of some good’ (Ar. *NE*, Bk 1, ch. 1). The good of the *politeia* was the attainment of happiness of the individual citizens. For these citizens to be happy they needed education in the right way to live. Such education could only come within a *politeia* that had good laws and was properly governed by the best in society. Yet, education for Aristotle is not, as it is for Plato, largely an exercise in personal self-discovery. Rather, much of it would be about the development of custom and habit. It is the wise educators who decide what the virtuous mean is, rather than each individual citizen. Training and education is, therefore, not about conscious choice, but about the passing on of customs that make life pleasant and workable for the individual.⁵ In *The Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle reinforces this point by stating that:

For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, the good of the community is clearly a greater and more perfect good both to get and to keep (Ar. *NE*, Bk I, ch. 2).

To modern ears this may sound harsh, but we must remember the context of the classical Greek *politeia*. Aristotle neatly summarises its ethos, and its *telos*, when he says ‘that man is by nature a political [ie: polis-dwelling] animal; it is his nature to live in a state [*politeia*]. He who by his nature... has no city, no state, is either too bad or too good, either sub-human, or super-human’ (Ar. *Pol*, Book I, ch. 2). To conform to our human nature, and therefore to be happy, requires us to live in a *politeia*, and our education should reflect this. According to Aristotle we need to be taught to want what is best for us through custom. The isolated individual (the word for individual, or private person, in Greek was *idiotēs*, from which we get our word idiot) ceases to be properly human, and lives in a constant state of war. There is, therefore, an imperative to defend the *politeia*, since it is the highest human ideal, from internal and external threats to its cohesion. The tools for this are education, laws and custom.

This leads to another important stage of Aristotle’s argument. Custom must be maintained by a strong civic virtue. This calls for extremely high levels of group cohesion, and consequently the *politeia* must also be small in scale. Civic virtue and patriotism within the various Hellenic communities are bolstered by a natural racial superiority, and by strict family and gender roles. Barbarians are naturally inferior for two reasons. First, they are environmentally sub-human because they do not live, or desire to live, in a *politeia*. Second, because of various reasons, including climate, they lack the proper mix of intelligence and courage. Barbarians are naturally slaves, a point made clear by their frequent inability to recognise the inferiority of the female (the slave by nature is on the same social level as the female, and therefore does not appreciate the difference between slave and female and male and female).⁶ As a result, barbarians have unnatural family relationships. Having established the superiority of the Hellene

⁵ This forms a central tenet of C. E. M. Joad’s interpretation of Aristotle (Joad, nd: 103). Much of this is discussed at the end of Book VII and Book VIII of *The Politics*, although elements appear elsewhere in Aristotle’s writings.

⁶ For Aristotle’s racial theories see Ar. *Politics* Bk I, ch. 2 and Bk VII, ch. 7

Aristotle goes on to reject pan-Hellenism too. Hellenes should form a plethora of *poleis*, since only through a *politeia* can we live a proper life. In order to keep the bonds strong, therefore, even Hellenes from another *politeia* should be excluded from citizenship. A system of free-floating citizenship, based purely on residence, would weaken the bonds of the close-knit community.⁷ Thus, high levels of cohesion are maintained by the smallness of communities, by their strong sense of racial superiority towards foreigners, by bonds of kinship and face-to-face community, and by inflexible family structures.

It is my contention, therefore, that Aristotle's views on foreigners, barbarians and women are not mere unfortunate additions to his moral and political philosophy, but instead a crucial part of it. His ideas of moderation, custom and xenophobia are all integral to his view of the proper way for people to live. It is a deliberately non-cosmopolitan political theory. Certainly, his communities have all the advantages of the conservative organic society. They do not desire conquest, and the members of the *politeia* are secure in their identity, ethics and *telos*. In this sense, Aristotle perfectly encapsulated the form and function of the classical Greek *polis*. Although much is made of the Athenian and Spartan 'empires' in modern historical commentaries, it is important to point out that not only were these aberrations for the vast majority of Hellenes, they also bore little resemblance to what we (or the Macedonians and Romans) would call empires. They were based on a mix of voluntary and involuntary alliances, which in the Athenian case included the new idea of tribute in lieu of military contribution. In other words, even the most imperialist of the classical Hellenes maintained both the form and substance of the idea of the *politeia*. The Athenian 'empire' remained a deformed and lopsided defence. It is worth noting that the prime message of Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian war was that the cause of Athenian imperialism (and final defeat) was to be found in the breakdown of the virtues associated with the *politeia*. Thucydides' hero is Pericles, who although he promoted Athenian glory, also stressed the moderation and civic (and xenophobic) pride that reappears in Aristotle's account (Th. *PW*, Bk II).

There is another important link between Aristotle and the practice of the classical period of Herodotus and Thucydides. For all of them war is important for the *polis*, but war was a defensive necessity carried out by militias, not a profession linked to expansion. Thucydides has a number of his characters praise peace, and see war as a necessary evil, while Aristotle condemns aggression in all cases except defence (Th. *PW*, Bk IV; Ar. *The Pol*, Bk VII, ch. 2). Indeed, expansion, by increasing the population size and bringing in other ethnic groups, would destroy the very institution of the *polis*. This is Thucydides' point. It crops up again in the Renaissance, where Machiavelli's condemnation of the Augustinian Empire is based on his love of the Republican institutions that were undermined by imperial expansion. Interestingly, Machiavelli was also a great advocate of amateur militias (NM *Dis*, Bk I, 21; Bk II, 20. NM *Pr*, chs XII-XIII). Perhaps, not surprisingly, it is in the institution of war, and the development of the armed forces, that the cosmopolitan and imperial alternative to Aristotle has its origins.

⁷ See his discussion in Ar. *Pol*, Bk III, ch. 1. It is well to remember that Aristotle himself was a resident alien (*metoikos*) at Athens.

THE MACEDONIAN REVOLUTION

In 359 BC Philip II became ruler of Macedon, a kingdom north of Greece that was generally looked down on by Hellenes as a barbarous backwater. The Macedonian cavalry had received the praise of Thucydides, but its infantry – local levies armed with wicker shields and precious little training – were so useless that even Macedon's rulers hardly relied on them (Th. *PW*, Bk II, 100). In 382 BC a Spartan general even advised King Amyntas of Macedon to hire mercenaries rather than rely on the Macedonian infantry (Hammond, 1994: 9). Philip, however, was a reformer. He had spent his youth as a hostage at Thebes, and was intent on modernising the army. Yet, Philip was no slavish copier of Greek practice. Rather, he used his Greek experience to develop a military machine superior to that of his Greek hosts.

The armies of the Greek *poleis* were based around the citizen heavy infantry, known as the hoplite. Formed into thick rectangles, or phalanxes, between six and twelve men deep, they were armed with long thrusting spears of about 2 to 2.5 metres (six to 7.5 feet) in length. The spears of the second rank would have projected beyond the shoulder of the rank in front, and thus the hoplite phalanx presented a formidable front of spearheads to its enemy. Battles were decided by a clash of phalanxes, although increasingly the armies also included light infantry, armed with throwing javelins or slings, to protect the flanks of the phalanx, and light cavalry for scouting and skirmishing. More than one military historian has posed the question: why did the Greeks rely on such an archaic system of arms? Heavy infantry is not well designed for shock combat, being slow and relying on a strict formation and drill that does not suit a sudden rush and clash of arms. Yet, this was exactly what the armies of the *poleis* did (Ferrill, 1997: 143-5). Herodotus puts an interesting criticism of the Greek hoplite system into the mouth of the Persian general Mardonius: 'for when they have declared war against one another, having found out the fairest and most level spot, they go down to it and fight; so that the conquerors depart with great loss, and of the conquered... they are utterly destroyed' (H. *H*, Bk VII, 9. Also quoted in Ferrill, 1997: 145). Of course, the lesson for Herodotus was the opposite of Mardonius' speech. After all, Mardonius was defeated by a hoplite army at Plataea in 479 BC. Yet, despite the undeniable value of Greek heavy infantry, the exclusive use of hoplites seems to have less to do with military expertise, and more to do with the conservative this-is-the-way-we-have-always-done-it attitude of the average Hellenic citizen (Ferrill, 1997: 144-5). This has also been linked to the requirements of Greek farming practices (Hanson, 1989; Hanson, 1995; and Foxhall, 1993).

With the exception of Sparta, which was ruled by a military caste, hoplites were predominantly small farmer-militiamen, who needed to return to their farms for the planting and harvest. As a result, wars were designed to be quick campaigns over specific issues. The armies of the classical *polis* were singly ill-suited for long campaigns, as the Athenians found out to their cost during their invasion of Sicily in 415-3 BC. Not only were the hoplites needed to take up their occupations back home, they also required a large baggage train. Each hoplite took at least one servant with him to help maintain his equipment. This meant that at least half of an army was non-combatant. An army's speed and manoeuvrability is dictated by its size. The larger an army (including baggage train), the more supplies it consumes, and the longer it has to

spend on foraging and purchasing food and animal fodder (Engels, 1978: ch. 1). A larger army also slows down start and stop times. Anyone stuck in a traffic jam knows that movement at the head of a queue takes a long time to pass down the line. The larger the queue the longer this takes. Similarly, for an army strung out across the road, the time it takes to get everyone moving after a stop increases arithmetically with size (Engels, 1978: Appendix 5). In addition to this, Greek armies had no commissariat, providing and organising a regular system of supply. ‘A relatively immobile, heavy army that has no commissariat, that lives off the land, most often dies on it, as did the Athenian army in Sicily’ (Ferrill, 1997: 146). In sum, the Greek way of war was suited to a conservative and non-imperial lifestyle.

The reforms of the Macedonian army had begun under Philip’s brother Alexander II, who had introduced the Greek hoplite system for the regular infantry (Hammond, 1994: 8-9). Philip was to carry these reforms further. First, he increased the length of the sarissa (pike) to probably about 5.4 metres (about 16 feet).⁸ This meant that it had to be wielded by both hands, and consequently the shield arm became immobile. Instead the phalanx relied on the bristle of pikes to protect itself from attack. A pike is not a weapon intended for single combat. It is only effective when part of a well-drilled unit. As a result, Philip relied on a professional army loyal only to him. This was made possible by the discovery and exploitation of gold and silver deposits. Philip’s phalanx could now be paid to be nothing but pikemen (or phalangites), rather than a militia with other professional considerations. Drilled until they formed a flexible and coherent unit, the Macedonian phalanx under Philip had no equal when attacked head-on. Indeed, the last Roman commander to face a Macedonian phalanx in the field, Aemilius Paulus, said that the sight of the phalanx in action had filled him with amazement and alarm (Pl. *AP*).

The Macedonian phalanx of Philip, unlike the hoplites of the Greeks, did not represent a self-standing unit, but was part of a combined arms army. While the phalanx had no equal in head-on confrontations, it was vulnerable to attack on the flank and rear. Philip, however, only envisioned it as one part of a larger system. The second arm of the new Macedonian system was based on Macedon’s own tradition of arms, its heavy cavalry. Philip had inherited a mounted bodyguard, drawn from the noble class, and called the *hetairoi*, or companions. These he changed into an effective heavy cavalry arm. The kernel of the new Macedonian way of war was to launch a cavalry charge on one of the wings, while the phalanx pinned the enemy centre. The shock cavalry charge would roll up one wing, and then the enemy centre would be simultaneously attacked by the cavalry in the flank and by the phalanx head-on. In sum, the companion cavalry was to be the hammer to the phalanx’s anvil (Fuller, 1998: ch.2; Ferrill, 1997: 175ff. Philip had realised that the Greek tradition of heavy infantry, while poorly suited to shock attack, was well suited to defence against shock, and for coordination with a smaller flanking cavalry shock arm.

In addition to the phalanx and the shock companion cavalry, Philip also converted his foot bodyguard into an elite and mobile heavy infantry unit called the hypaspists, who could be used either to protect the flank of the phalanx, or as part of the shock attack on the enemy flank. Highly trained lighter peltasts⁹ and missile troops were

⁸ See Connolly, 1998: 69 for a discussion of the size of the sarissa.

⁹ Unarmoured infantry armed with javelins. Their name derives from the small shield they carried, called a *pelta*.

added to protect the flank of the phalanx.¹⁰ Many of these lighter troops were drawn from various subject peoples and allies; and as Macedonia developed, its army became more multicultural. Since Macedonia had been an ethnically mixed polity from its origins, this idea of a multicultural army had deep roots in Macedonian military practice (Hammond, 1994: 5. G. P. Baker has argued that this was actually a Carthaginian innovation. Baker, 1929: viii-ix). What Philip had created here was a system, based both on Greek and traditional Macedonian practice, that was an effective battlefield weapon.¹¹ Yet, there was one other innovation to complete the Macedonian system.

Philip's army was a brilliant tactical machine, but an army is also judged by its strategic manoeuvrability. One of the outstanding features of the campaigns of both Philip and Alexander was their ability to move with lightning speed. It was Philip's speed during his campaign against the Athenians and Thebans, for example, that allowed him to cross the pass of Thermopylae before the Greeks had time to block it. The Macedonian military genius extended to the provision and organisation of supply. First, Philip limited the size of the non-combatant numbers in the army. Infantrymen were only allowed one servant for every ten men, while cavalry were restricted to one each. While a Greek army had consisted of over half non-combatants, the Macedonian army would have consisted of not more than a quarter non-combatants (Engels, 1978: 12). This not only made the army easier to move, but also cut down the supplies needed to feed the army without reducing its power as a fighting force. Second, Philip outlawed wagons, and made his soldiers and their servants carry their own equipment and supplies.¹² Carts had two major disadvantages. First, they were slow, unwieldy and liable to break down, particularly with the system of throat harnesses used in the ancient world. Second, they were limited to roads and good country, and could not be taken over rough terrain that makes up so much of the eastern Mediterranean (Engels, 1978: 15-6). Finally, the Macedonians seemed to have turned supply into a military art. Philip required his soldiers to take thirty days rations with them when they started out on campaign, thereby limiting the need to waste time foraging (Connolly, 1998: 69. The original source for this was Frontinus). According to Engel, the Macedonians must have also had a skilled commissariat. He points, as evidence of this, to the fast march rate of Alexander's army (an average of 15 miles a day, with a high of almost 20 miles per day), and the nature of the terrain they traversed. An army of that size could not have met its supply requirements by forage alone. Rather it would have required a system of supply by sea, the purchase of supplies ahead of the army, and a system of control and dispersal second to none in the ancient world (1978: ch. 1).

Thus, under Philip the Macedonian army became a skilled and fast moving organisation that had been fine-tuned for successful conquest. Structurally Philip's reforms produced a machine that worked under a different logic from the *polis*. Whereas in the *polis* value was conferred on people through their citizenship and by face-to-face elections for limited term magistracies, value in the Macedonian army was measured in terms of professional skill. Put differently, the Macedonian system of organisation rested

¹⁰ Ferrill thinks that these lighter troops owed their genesis to Greek and Macedonian copies of Persian light troops (1997: 180).

¹¹ The influence of Persian and Near Eastern cavalry tactics was probably also important (Ferrill, 1997: ch. 5).

¹² We owe this intelligence to Frontinus, writing in the first century AD (Fr. *Str*, Bk 4, 1,6). The same policy was introduced into the Roman army by Marius (Pl. *M*).

on a modern instrumental rationality that put a premium on competence, as opposed to a system that bases position on citizenship or blood-ties. People who could offer a particular skill that was useful to the organisation gained status within it, although under Philip the vast bulk of these were Macedonians. Under Alexander this logic would lead to a more ethnically mixed organisation. Philip's military organisation was also based on a segmented division of labour. The Greek hoplite armies, with very few exceptions, were based on a single type of soldier, and even the development of the lighter peltasts in the fourth century BC did not undermine this reliance on the hoplite. The Macedonian combined arms system was made up of a number of specialised types of unit, each one serving a different battlefield duty, and each one relying on its fellows to perform functions for it. Finally, whereas the loyalty of the citizen-hoplite was to the *politeia*, an abstract community given institutional form through a constitution seen as sacred, the Macedonian soldiery owed its allegiance to the idea of Macedonia made manifest in the person of the king. This was reinforced by the Macedonian tradition that the army was responsible for electing and confirming the succession. Thus, while the classical Greek citizen was loyal to a community of a particular shape and form, the Macedonian soldier was loyal to an idea that could change its form and purpose over time.

FROM ARMY TO EMPIRE. THE ALEXANDRINE REVOLUTION

The conventional wisdom, backed up by extensive historical research, is that Philip never intended to create an empire to rival the Persian. His goal was the modest one of uniting the Greeks under his leadership, and liberating the Greek cities in Asia Minor that were under Persian rule. This may be true, although no one can really know what Philip would have done once he had defeated the Persians in Asia Minor. What we do know for sure is that Alexander did have a different vision in mind, but whether this matured over time, or whether it was always his goal we do not know. What we can say about Philip, however, is that the military machine he created worked. Alexander took it on a thirteen year campaign, and in the process created an empire.

Alexander inherited not just the institutional framework of the army, he also inherited its professionalism. Philip had worked closely with, and groomed, a small number of top quality officers, who formed the original core of Alexander's army. Some, like Antipater, were from the generation before Philip. Antipater's skills at administration were such that Alexander made him regent of Macedonia in his absence, during which time Antipater led a successful campaign against the Spartans in 331 BC. Parmenion, who had to his credit the defeat of the Illyrians in the year of Alexander's birth, was a contemporary of Philip and a master at the use of the Macedonian system. He was to be Alexander's second in command (taking the left wing) in the three major battles against the Persians. Amongst the others, Antigonus Monophthalmos proved an effective general and governor in Anatolia, where he defeated the remnants of the Persian cavalry from the battle of Issus. Koenos served Alexander well as a unit commander, and Craterus was an effective field commander, and second in command after the execution of Parmenion. To this cadre left by Philip Alexander attached his boyhood friends, whom he had trained himself. These included a number who held commands later in Asia: Ptolemy, Perdikkas, Leonnatus, Hephaestion, Nearchus and

Erigyus. Erigyus, a close friend of Alexander's, represents the shape of things to come. Unlike the others he was from Mytilene, a Greek city. Later the army would include a host of non-Macedonian commanders, of which Eumenes of Cardia was perhaps the most prominent. In short, the Macedonian army combined a powerful and complex military system with a superb officer class capable of excelling in both military and civilian administration.¹³ These acted as a staff council around Alexander, as well as a pool of generals that could be trusted with the increasingly frequent independent military and civil commands (Tarn, quoted in Fuller, 1998: 52n).

Although the historians of Alexander's campaign were more interested in the drama of the conquest than mundane issues of day-to-day administration, we know enough from these sources to piece together the form and composition of the expedition. There are three elements of interest here, two of which are important to the transition from army to empire. First, and again in contrast to the Greeks, Alexander's army had a large technical support section. Amongst the most important of these was the engineering corps -- commanded by the chief engineer, Diades of Thessaly, who was instrumental at the siege of Tyre. There were also experts in bridge-building and even people acquainted with the shipwright's arts.¹⁴ In addition to this, the path of Alexander's army was mapped out by surveyors, who were supplemented by effective scouting. Connolly sees this as a major departure from Greek practice. Classical Greek armies did little scouting, and history is full of examples of armies blundering around on campaign. By contrast, Alexander used a screen of scouts to give him information about the surrounding area.¹⁵ The surveyors would also be of crucial importance in the transition from a military to an imperial system. Throughout his new empire Alexander would copper-fasten his hold by establishing cities populated by veteran soldiers. Although Arrian and Curtius both mention Alexander personally laying out the new city of Alexandria-by-Egypt, given the complexity of town planning it is more likely that he left the more mundane decisions to his surveyors, while he took an active interest in the project as a whole. Curtius hints as much when he says that after marking out the boundaries he 'left men to supervise construction of the city' (*Cur. Al*, Bk IV, ch. 8; *Arr. Al*, Bk III, ch. 2. Plutarch largely follows Arrian's account). We do know that the man left in charge was an architect by the name of Deinocrates (Tarn, quoted in Fuller, 1998: 52).

In addition to the technical support, Alexander also took along people who would be crucial for the long-term development of an imperial structure. These were the men of words, particularly historians and geographers. The role of the historians was

¹³ An alternative view of the officer corps is offered by G. T. Griffith, who claims that it was Alexander, not Philip, who developed the cadre of Macedonian officers. Griffith claims that really only Parmenion distinguished himself as a general under Philip, and that Philip's strong hands-on approach to the army prevented others getting good command experience under him (Griffith, 1992: 58-77).

¹⁴ Hephaestion, for example, bridged the Indus, possibly with Perdiccas (*Arr. Al*, Bk V, ch. 4; *Cur. Al*, Bk 8, chs 10 and 12). Both Curtius and Arrian refer to the building of a large fleet on the Indus, although the details are tantalizingly sparse. (*Arr. Al*, Bk VI, ch. 1; *Cur. Al*, Bk IX, ch. 3). Griffith argues that this engineering competence was a product of Philip's reforms, and was key to Philip's successes against the cities in the northern Aegean (Griffith, 1992: 59-62).

¹⁵ Connolly, 1998: 72-3. For example, according to Arrian just before the battle of the Granicus Alexander sent out 'scouts ahead of the army, under the command of Amyntas, son of Arrabaeus, with the squadron of Companion cavalry from Apollonia under Socrates, son of Sathon, and four squadrons of what were known as advanced scouts' (*Arr. Al*, Bk I, ch. 12).

both to record the campaign for posterity, and to construct a philosophy of empire on the march. The first of these was important to ancient Greeks and Macedonians, as it is to modern propagandists (Thucydides, for example, has Pericles declare in his funeral oration that Athens' glory will outlive it in the lasting memorials to its spirit of adventure (Th. *PW*, Bk II, 41)). Indeed, one of the campaign historians – Aristobolus – was the major ancient (but now lost) source for the history of the campaign. To him and Ptolemy we owe the strongly pro-Alexander history of Arrian. The geographers were a new development that also linked directly to empire. Geography is a fundamentally imperial academic discipline, linked as it is to mapping territory for the purposes of control. It is interesting to note that it was hardly practiced by the classical Greeks (why map a region that a face-to-face community knows and agrees to by tradition?) In the modern age the big boost to the growth of geography and cartography was the development of the territorial state, and its need for centralised control for military and tax purposes. The same went for Alexander's geographers. Alexander's campaign was also a mission of exploration designed to map and control. When Nearchus was dispatched by Alexander up the Persian Gulf, for example, it was with instructions to record the nature of the lands thereabout (Cur. *AI*, Bk IX, ch. 10 and Bk X, ch. 1; Arr. *AI*, Bk VI, ch. 20 and 28). Modern writers have found the distances recorded by Alexander's geographers, which survive in the later writings of Strabo and Pliny, remarkably accurate (Engels, 1978: 4).¹⁶

Finally, either Alexander or Philip had altered the army structure to make the army more effective against a Persian foe. Fighting against heavy infantry armies, Philip's forces had been made up mainly of infantry, with just enough heavy cavalry to envelop the enemy's left flank. The Persian armies were made up of mainly medium and light infantry, with a high reliance on archers, and larger amounts of highly trained cavalry. At Chaeronea in 338 BC Philip's ratio of infantry to cavalry when facing a hoplite army was 30 to 1. By contrast, at the start of Alexander's Asian campaign in 334 BC that ratio was 6 to 1 (Santosuosso, 1997: 167-8). In terms of the development of an imperial ethic this reveals a crucial factor in the success of the Macedonian system: its ability to adapt to changing situations and opponents as the conquest took it to new challenges. A conservative defensive army can get by with little innovative change as long as it fights on the same terrain against similar foes (the hoplite system, despite the addition of light troops, had not changed in its essentials in about four centuries). An army that wishes to fight different systems over vastly different territory must be able to adapt and change. So, before leaving the Macedonians had already altered the structure of their forces in order to guarantee that their flanking strategy could still be effective against a different kind of foe. Since the Persians had a strong cavalry presence it was necessary for the Macedonians to counteract this with a stronger shock force. Similar innovations were to occur on the hoof. For example, coming up against elephants for the first time at the battle of the Hydaspes (Jhelum) Alexander made good use of horse archers -- recruited from peoples formerly subject to Persia, and unknown in a Macedonian army until the conquest -- to soften up the Indian left before the heavy cavalry assault. When the heavy cavalry had weakened (but not dislodged) the Indian left he used the phalanxes, with their shields locked, as a means of breaking the now

¹⁶ It has to be noted, however, that despite the promotion of geography and surveying, Ancient maps remained primitive by modern standards.

disorganised Indian elephants and cavalry (Arr. *Al*, Bk V, chs 17-18). By altering the ratios of troop types, and sometimes adding new ones, the Macedonian army guaranteed that it could adapt to any strategic and tactical novelty.

While the army proved the essential tool for empire-building, it was in his development of a corresponding imperial ethics that Alexander's legacy is simultaneously at its most enduring and most (at least for its time) controversial. While the development of the Macedonian army system was a combination of Greek practice, Macedonian traditions and Philip's own innovations; the Alexandrine imperial doctrine was a mix of Macedonian military form, Persian imperial practice and Alexander's own spark of divinity. Before proceeding it is probably important to mention the role of Persia here. One could counter my suggestion that the Macedonians invented the western conception of political organisation by pointing out the earlier precedent of the Persian Empire. Certainly, many of the important parts of Macedonian imperial practice in the Hellenistic period were borrowed from the Persians. While the role of the Persians in the development of our idea of empire, especially their place in the idea of empire developed by Alexander and, later, Seleucus, is important, we must keep in mind that until Alexander no elements of the Persian imperial system were deemed exportable. Certainly Persian military doctrine had no real effect on its neighbours in India or Greece, and Persian imperial administration did not provide the basis of either Athenian or Spartan hegemony. Thus, what we inherited from the Achaemenid Persians was mediated through the Macedonians. This does not mean that the Persian system was somehow inferior (after all, Alexander and his successors did not think so, judging by their desire to copy Persian custom in the teeth of the xenophobia of their followers), only that it took Alexander to turn it into an exportable political ethics. In this sense, our Persian legacy is tied up inextricably with the Macedonian. We see this as well in the development of the later Iranian empires of Pontus, Parthia and Sassanid Persia, all three of which drew freely from earlier Macedonian precedents.

The imperial ethics of Alexander were a product of the army structure itself. The political system was based on individual ability, rather than citizenship or kinship ties. Certainly, many of Alexander's appointments were given to close personal friends, yet even here Alexander seems to have chosen his friends well, and all seemed suited to the responsibilities that he gave them. Friendship, however, was never a crucial deciding factor in appointments, and even Alexander's closest friend, Hephaestion, was restricted to commands that reflected his modest abilities. Perhaps the most serious of Alexander's lapses of judgement in regards to his friends was in his appointment of Harpalus as treasurer. Guilty of desertion before the battle of Issus, and later of squandering money while Alexander was in India, Harpalus organised an abortive insurrection in Athens (Arr. *Al*, Bk III, ch. 6; Diodorus Siculus, Bk XVII, ch. 108). More interesting is the extent that his choices for senior positions went to people outside of the close circle of his friends. Parmenion, his father's general, was chosen as his second in command. Alexander's choice for the key satrapy of Phrygia was Antigonus Monophthalmos, while the regency went to Antipater, both old war horses of his father's time. Early on key technical jobs went to skilled Greeks, such as the engineer Diades of Thessaly or Alexander's secretary, and eventually general, Eumenes of Cardia. All of these excelled in their positions. Soon after his invasion Alexander also began to appoint and reappoint certain key Persians to former Persian satrapies. Some of these were grave

disappointments (having betrayed one king, some thought little of betraying another), others great successes. Artabazus was perhaps the best of the Persians in Alexander's imperial administration. He and his family proved invaluable to Alexander in his Bactrian campaigns.

Despite anecdotal failures, this process does represent the victory of an instrumental rationality over the ties of friendship, blood and culture within the Macedonian system of organisation. There was also another spin-off from this system of putting competence ahead of tradition. Aristotle in particular and the Hellenic *polis* in general, saw no political role for women. In fact, as Michael Grant makes clear, in the wealthier strata of Athenian society they were frequently segregated and hidden in separate women's quarters (1992: 5-6). By contrast, the Hellenistic world created by Alexander's conquests was more accepting of women in public life, even if the numbers of women in positions in power was still minute. Part of this went back to pre-Philipian Macedonia, where the pastoral nature of society required women to be directly involved in economic activity, and part may be due to the role of Alexander's mother, Queen Olympias, who despite her poor reputation in later histories, commanded the loyalties of many Macedonians. Yet, a larger part of the explanation lies in the Hellenistic acceptance of any ruler as long as they were competent. The Seleucid queen Cleopatra Thea, and the Ptolemaic Cleopatra VII attracted the loyalty of their male subordinates through administrative and political genius. Lower down the social scale, women could own property in their own right,¹⁷ and many became literary, artistic and intellectual figures, like Phile of Priene, who designed and built a reservoir and an aqueduct (Grant, 1992: 24). Obviously, too much can be made of these examples. Society still remained male dominated. On the other hand, however, there is no doubt that the idea of the superiority of competence in the world Alexander had created allowed some extremely gifted women to excel in a way that they never could have in Aristotle's narrow *polis*.

The issue of the use of Persian noblemen brings up the cornerstone of Alexander's new imperial policy. The new empire was to be a multicultural one, linking together especially the three key ethnic groups of the Macedonians, Greeks and Persians. Part of this multiculturalism was just passive good sense. An Egyptian was given civil control in Egypt, cities both Greek and non-Greek in Asia Minor were allowed to keep their self-government, Persians were retained in certain satrapies, and Indian rulers like Taxiles and Porus continued to rule their kingdoms as Alexandrine protectorates. Yet, for the practical reason that there just were not enough Macedonians and Greeks to govern the whole Empire, as Fuller notes (1998: 272), this passive policy was not enough. Alexander's charm offensive with the Persian nobility was designed to give them a stake in his Empire, and to furnish him with a larger pool of potential soldiers and administrators.

The policy of fusion between the Macedonian and Persian nobility began with changes to court etiquette. In order to make Persians feel more comfortable Alexander introduced the Persian custom of prostration to the King (*proskynesis*). This was resented by the Macedonians and Greeks. It was also instrumental in Alexander's drunken argument with his close friend Black Clitos. Alexander's killing of Clitos, and his deep-seated regret afterwards, demonstrates the tensions between Alexander's roles

¹⁷ Compare this to fifth century Athens, where women citizens were required to have a male guardian, or *kyrios*, throughout their lives (Murray, 1988: 206).

as Macedonian chieftain and Lord of Asia (Arr. *Al*, Bk IV, chs 8-13. See also Curtius' more damning account of Alexander's 'orientalism' in Cur. *Al*, Bk VIII, ch. 5). Tensions were also raised when Alexander adopted Persian and Median dress in public (Arr. *Al*, Bk IV, ch. 8). In 324 BC Alexander pulled off his greatest feat of multicultural integration when he arranged the wedding of his close Macedonian companions with the daughters of senior Persian noblemen, including his own marriage to a daughter of Darius (Arr. *Al*, Bk VII, chs 4-5; Cur. *Al*, Bk X, ch. 3). Tellingly, after Alexander's death most of the Macedonians repudiated their Persian wives. A notable exception was Seleucus, but Seleucus inherited most of Alexander's eastern empire after the wars of succession, and continued much of Alexander's imperial policy as well. Alexander's integration of 30,000 Iranian troops, armed in the Macedonian manner, in either the same year as the weddings or 327 BC, completed the process of creating a fundamentally multicultural army. According to Arrian Alexander called these youths his 'inheritors' (*epigoni*), and to the annoyance of the Macedonians, placed them on an equal footing with the rest of the army (Arr. *Al*, Bk VII, ch. 6). Alexander's final act of reconciliation with the Persians was his appointment of Peucestas as satrap of Persia. Not only was Peucestas a loyal supporter of Alexander, but more importantly he was a Macedonian who had taken it upon himself to learn Persian and adopt Persian dress (Arr. *Al*, Bk VII, ch. 6-7). Peucestas, after raising Persian troops for the army, is later congratulated by Alexander for his orderly rule of Persia (Arr. *Al*, Bk. VII, ch. 23). Although death was to cut short Alexander's policy of integration it is clear, to quote Fuller that:

His empire was to be neither Greek, nor Macedonian, nor Asiatic, it was to be Alexandrian. In its conception there are no traces of Aristotle's ideas, and it went far beyond those of Isocrates, who never dreamt of raising Asiatics to Partnership with Greeks. It broke with the basic conceptions of the Hellenic world, and substituted for them a new world outlook (1998: 272).

The two pillars of individual ability and multiculturalism were joined by a third element in the ethics of Alexander's Empire: the segmented nature of government. Just as the army was based on a number of specialised mutually dependent units, so Alexander's imperial government was constructed out of a number of different forms of government, in which Alexander played different roles. To the Macedonian army he was their companion-King – a leader who had been chosen by them, and whose role as commander-in-chief never completely blotted out his place as their 'first amongst equals'. To the Greeks of the Balkan peninsula he was the commander-in-chief of the League of Corinth, and their ally. To the Asiatic Greeks, and many independent non-Greek cities and kingdoms, he was ally and liberator, to the Egyptians he was a god-king, while to the Persians he was their direct (but mortal) sovereign. In the eastern part of the old Persian Empire Alexander had separated military and civil responsibility (this was supplemented by putting the key fortresses of Sardes, Tyre, Gaza, Pelusium, Memphis and Babylon under the control of Macedonian commanders separate from the satrapy system (Fuller, 1998: 268)). When Satibarzanes was reconfirmed as satrap of Aria Alexander also sent Anaxippus with forty men as 'guards' (Arr. *Al*, Bk III, ch. 25).

Similarly, when Amminapes was made satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, Tlepolemus, one of the Companions, was appointed to the military command (Arr. *Al*, Bk III, ch. 22). Given the questionable loyalty, although undeniable skill, of these converted satraps this seems to have been a deliberate strategy to prevent revolt (in the case of Satibarzanes the precaution did not work. The new satrap murdered Anaxippus and rose in rebellion). Much of this system had evolved as a response to local conditions, but it reflected the point that the Alexandrine imperial system was always different things to different peoples. As new local conditions were confronted Alexander adapted his political strategy accordingly. Thus, unlike the static and atemporal truths of Aristotle's *politeia*, the *imperium* of Alexander was a mutable and changing political community. A similar approach was to be taken a few generations later by the Romans, who mixed alliances, direct rule, protectorates and full citizenship in order to create a stable and more lasting imperial legacy. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the British Empire also combined a mix of dominion-status, self-governing colonies, non-self-governing colonies, protectorates and dependencies.

Linked to this policy of segmented government was Alexander's near-mania for building cities. Alexander's civic foundations were designed to form part of the glue of empire. The foundation of cities as the basis of forward defence had been a policy of Philip (who founded, amongst others, Philippopolis – modern Plovdiv – in Thrace), and an earlier suggestion of Isocrates as a means of controlling Asiatic territory. Settled by a mix of veterans and local people, these cities preserved the form of Greek city life, but were under the control of the Royal administration. Their Greek character can be seen from the excavations at Ai Khanoum in Afghanistan, where a Greek *gymnasion* and fragments of philosophical texts have been found (Fox, 1988: 334, and the picture on 360). The most lasting and successful of Alexander's foundations is obviously Alexandria-By-Egypt, which was the capital of the Ptolemaic Empire until 30 BC.

In all, the Alexandrine legacy was a combination of factors that would prove a successful part of the Western system of social organisation. The ideas of individualism based on competence, of multiculturalism, of a segmented government with different specialised departments linked through mutual dependence, of a spatially based political order mapped out by surveyors, and of the prime importance of adaptability in a world made uncertain by the very practice of the imperial logic are all direct descendants of Alexander's military organisation and imperial ethics.

ALEXANDER'S LEGACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF THE WEST

It is important to reiterate the point made in the introduction that, rather than representing a single ideology, Alexander's imperialism has always been a coin with two sides. Yes, it is a means of conquest and imperial control, but it has also been its opposite in the form of a pacific cosmopolitanism. Both of these incompatible ideas are contained in the legacy. What unites them is a rejection of the narrow (both territorially and socially) conservative world of Aristotle, although Aristotle's legacy still breathes in the worlds of the small town conservative and the ethno-nationalist.

Perhaps the first group to take up this more radical interpretation of empire were the stoics, who openly preached Alexander's cherished idea of multiculturalism, sometimes combined with a hatred of the injustice of war: 'The splendour of this hopeless dream may remind us that not one but two of the great lines of socio-political thought that have divided the world since go back to Alexander of Macedon' (Tarn, 1953: 437). Stoicism's yearning for a perfect society uniting all humanity became associated with the Roman Empire in the first century BC, and formed the basis of Marcus Aurelius' 'idea of Rome' quoted in the film *Gladiator*. This, in turn, became a pillar of the post-Saint Augustine Catholic Church, and was rediscovered as a secular yearning by the Enlightenment, and its intellectual children liberalism and socialism. In this sense, the idea of a universal set of human rights is as much part of the legacy of Alexander as is the idea of a formal imperialism.

Less radical in intent is the legacy of political organisation. Whereas the classical Greek *polis*, and its system of direct face-to-face control in an extremely small community, says little to us in terms of our organisational experience, anyone who has worked in the modern public or private sector would immediately recognise the army and empire of Alexander as a system that they are familiar with. Its ideas of specialised departments, power through competence, rampant individualism contained within a single minded organisation, the importance of adaptability, a dominant instrumental rationality, and a clear chain of command have all survived the millennia as the basis of western organisation. The great captains of industry in the twentieth century – Henry Ford, Lord Beaverbrook, George Soros, Richard Branson or Bill Gates – have demonstrated management styles that owe more to Alexander than they do to Pericles. Even anarchism, often seen as the opposite of this form of political organisation, is drawn more from the Alexandrine than the Aristotelian tradition. Anarchism's conception of organisation uses the same idea of instrumental rationality and competence, but frames it in an egalitarian and libertarian view of political community. Ideas of topless federations and cooperatively run institutions have served to democratise the idea of imperial organisation. Aristotle's notion of civic virtue within a static and xenophobic order has little in common with the individualistic and cosmopolitan ideas associated with Kropotkin and Proudhon

Where does this leave us? Just as capitalism, according to Marx, reordered the world so that there was no going back to feudalism, so Alexandrine imperialism has closed off a return to the *polis*. Yet, we should not interpret this as a backward step. Capitalism in Marx's view opened up a space for global socialism, so the new Alexandrine world offered us the chance to embrace ideas of progress and cultural diversity. The conservative world of Aristotle is no doubt emotionally more secure – there are no confusions about identity or our place in the world – but it is also a lower order existence. It lacks challenge and the potential to change and develop, even though those challenges and potential often threaten to end in personal disaster. There is no place in Aristotle for self-creation, but similarly there is a strong and comforting social cohesion. Alexander has made the western mind lonelier and less secure, but he has also allowed it to imagine different worlds. The origins of this new political life lie, ironically, in innovations in military organisation. In this sense, our modern notions of organisation and instrumental rationality are products of war. This should not surprise us. Security, rather than prosperity, has always been the first concern of political

communities. Therefore it makes sense that the first, and paradigmatic, state institution should be the army. Instrumental rationality is a bequest to, not an invention of, the market.

For good or ill we are all children of Alexander. On his deathbed Alexander is reputed to have said (although it is certainly apocryphal) that there would be great funeral games after his death (*Cur. Al*, Bk X, ch. 5). Indeed there have been. We still chase his ideal. Some, in the past, have seen themselves as powerful conquerors, while others have taken to heart his idea of a cosmopolis. Both are united in a desire to recreate an ideal that they may not even consciously link to the Macedonian. What is certain is that they have all forgotten Aristotle.

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A Note on Sources and References

The Limerick papers in Politics and Public Administration use the Harvard system of referencing. While this is fine for much political science research, it works less well for classic texts, where there may be many different editions and translations. It is usually easier to quote the internationally recognised book, chapter and section numbers, which are standard to all editions of the same work. Since this paper makes strong use of works by ancient authors I have used the standard referencing system when quoting from them. I shall also be using the following abbreviations:

Ar. <i>Pol</i>	Aristotle, <i>The Politics</i> .
Ar. <i>NA</i>	Aristotle, <i>The Nicomachean Ethics</i> .
Arr. <i>Al</i>	Arrian, <i>The Campaigns of Alexander</i> .
Cur. <i>Al</i>	Quintus Curtius Rufus, <i>The History of Alexander</i> .
DS. <i>H</i>	Diodorus Siculus, <i>History</i> .
Fr. <i>Str</i>	Frontinus, <i>Strategemata</i> .
H. <i>H</i>	Herodotus, <i>Histories</i> .
NM <i>Dis</i>	Niccolo Machiavelli, <i>The Discourses</i> .
NM <i>Pr</i>	Niccolo Machiavelli, <i>The Prince</i> .
Pl. <i>AP</i>	Plutarch, <i>Life of Aemilius Paulus</i> .
Pl. <i>M</i>	Plutarch, <i>Life of Marius</i> .
Th. <i>PW</i>	Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> .

When using Greek and Macedonian names in the text I have used the most common English usage (which usually derives from the Latin version). Where there is no common English variant I have used the original Greek.

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